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TRANSNATIONAL MUTUAL
RECOGNITION REGIMES: GOVERNANCE
WITHOUT GLOBAL GOVERNMENT
KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS* & GREGORY SHAFFER**
I
INTRODUCTION
Scholars of globalization and international and transnational governance are
putting forth a growing number of conceptual frameworks to examine and address issues of law and global governance. These frameworks include constitutional, contract, and (now) global administrative law constructs. As the framing
paper in this symposium issue defines it, “global administrative law” comprises
“the mechanisms, principles, practices and supporting social understandings
that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative
bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency,
participation, reasoned decision and legality, and by providing effective review
of the rules and decisions they make.”1 This article discusses managed mutual
recognition regimes within a global administrative law framework, although, as
will be seen, it often uses the term “transnational administrative law” (or
“transnational governance”) because of the horizontal, trans-governmental
character of mutual recognition regimes. This article argues that transnational
mutual recognition regimes are not simply one option among many available in
the palette of global administrative law, but rather a core element of any global
governance regime that eschews global government. The diffusion of mutual
recognition regimes partakes in shaping a system of global subsidiarity that rejects (or at least does not unquestionably accept) the temptations of centralization and hierarchical constitutionalization of global economic relations.2
As a practical matter, the global administrative law construct is forced to
deal with the limitations of any “global” governance regime in relation to naCopyright © 2005 by Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer
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1. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
2. See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or
Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73 (2003).
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tional analogues. On the one hand, there is no “government” at the global
level, whether in the form of a global legislature, global executive, or global
court with mandatory jurisdiction and enforcement powers. On the other hand,
the world is globalizing in terms of the intensity and extensiveness of exchange,
governance mechanisms are emerging to deal with those exchanges, and publics
are demanding that these mechanisms be more accountable. Scholars have responded by trying to understand (positively) what is happening on the ground
by putting forward normative models as to how these mechanisms should operate, often in the hope of influencing decisionmakers in the way they might steer
global and transnational processes.
This article examines the model of mutual recognition within the concept of
an emerging, inchoate, and fragmented system (if one may be so bold to use the
term “system”) of global and transnational administrative law. Mutual recognition forms an essential part of any global administrative law regime by creating
conditions under which participating parties commit to the principle that if a
product or a service can be sold lawfully in one jurisdiction, it can be sold lawfully in any other participating jurisdiction. In order to give effect to this general principle, governments adopt mutual recognition as a contractual norm
whereby they agree to the effective transfer of regulatory authority—or jurisdiction—from the host country where a transaction takes place, to the home country from which a product, a person, a service, or a firm originates, subject to
agreed (and managed) conditions.3 Why such a demand for foregoing the ageold notion of “when in Rome do as the Romans do” in favor of the recognition,
and thus extraterritorial application, of national laws? And under what conditions is this move acceptable to the various actors involved? These questions
form the starting point for analysis.
In practice, mutual recognition, in all its incarnations, is conditional. Mutual
recognition regimes set the conditions governing the recognition of the validity
of foreign laws, regulations, standards, and certification procedures among
states in order to assure host country regulatory officials and citizens that their
application within their borders is “compatible” with their own, and that incoming products and services are safe. These conditions involve different types of
obligations for home states, who benefit from conditional recognition of the
laws and regulations applicable to products, persons, firms and services, and
host states, who forego the application of their own rules to products, persons,
firms and services, provided that the agreed conditions are met.
In this sense, mutual recognition regimes are always “managed,” and thus
differ from a pure “free trade” model by involving a (often highly) political
process of assessment of mutual compatibility between national systems of gov-

3. These jurisdictions are generally sovereign states, but they can also be sub-national units of
federal entities. The term mutual recognition can be broken down into its two components. The “recognition” component entails recognition of the “equivalence,” “compatibility,” or (at least) “acceptability” of a counterpart’s regulatory system. The “mutuality” component indicates that the reallocation of authority is reciprocal and simultaneous.
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ernance. What constitutes such compatibility is usually seriously contested. To
answer the question, governments and social actors must assess what constitutes
“legitimate” or “acceptable” differences between them, that is, differences that
should not preclude the application of home country rules on host country territory or in relation to host country citizens. Such assessment can be made unilaterally or through collaboration. In fact, a great deal of recognition occurs as
a result of unilateral regulatory reforms that are oriented to be “mutual recognition friendly.”4 These unilateral developments may or may not be supplemented by negotiations over recognition where “acceptable differences” become the object of negotiation. In either case, the globalization of economic
management always results in the direct confrontation of differences of all
sorts—legal, social, political, fiscal—in areas where these differences had previously been confronted at arm’s length.
This prospect can be liberating for some but feared by others, as exemplified
by the debate around the proposed “Bolkenstein directive” in the European
Union (E.U.) regarding the liberalization of trade in services.5 The proposed
directive purports to apply the principle of home country control across all remaining services that have not previously been subject to a specific E.U. law.
The generalization of this approach was a main objective of the 1986 White Paper published under Jacques Delors’ leadership, but it has failed to be implemented in many services sectors. Many actors across the political spectrum
have opposed it precisely because home country rule is regarded as a potential
menace to host state social and economic order. The recent enlargement of the
E.U. to include ten new countries, resulting in greater economic and cultural
gaps than ever before, has exacerbated these fears. At the same time, enlargement has expanded the coverage of E.U. “regional administrative law” and
made it a better laboratory than ever as to what may eventually happen in the
realm of global administrative law.
This article uses alternatively the terms “mutual recognition regimes” and
“mutual recognition agreements” (MRAs). The latter term is prevalent in diplomatic speech but of a narrower import. Under MRAs, parties apply the principle of mutual recognition to specific economic sectors, subject to varying constraints and caveats. Although the concept of mutual recognition is best known
for its development and implementation within the E.U., the term “mutual recognition agreements,” in reference to inter-governmental agreements, is not actually used in the internal E.U. context for government-to-government agree4. The Organsation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was involved in a
broad scale assessment exercise of the interrelation between trade liberalization and regulatory reform
between 1995 and 2001. For a synthesis, see Kalypso Nicolaidis, Harmonisation and Recognition: What
Have we Learned? in Trade and Regulatory Reform: Insights from Country Experience, OECD Publications (2001).
5. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Services in the Internal Market, COM(04)2 final/3. For a discussion of the interrelation between the
role of ideas and interests in the liberalization of trade in services see William Drake & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT’L
ORG. 37 (1992).
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ments. Rather, the principle of “mutual recognition” is embedded in directives
and regulations agreed upon through E.U. political processes or applied in
judgments of the European Court of Justice. In the E.U. context, the term
“mutual recognition agreements” was introduced to describe contracts between
private conformity assessment bodies from different member states that would
evaluate and (where applicable) certify products and production processes. The
use of the term was subsequently transferred to the external bilateral context to
describe agreements between states (including between the E.U. and other
states) to implement the mutual recognition principle.
This article is in seven parts. Following this introduction, Part II situates the
norm of mutual recognition in relation to alternative approaches to manage
globalization by assessing its relationship with the principles of extraterritoriality, national treatment, and harmonization. Part III examines the structure of
mutual recognition regimes within a (potentially) emerging order of global administrative law, including the subject matters and the principle actors involved.
Part IV assesses the factors that explain the rise and operation of mutual recognition regimes and their constraints. Part V addresses mutual recognition regimes from the normative perspectives examined in the framing paper—those
of administrative accountability, private rights, and democratic legitimacy—
focusing particularly on accountability mechanisms and the democracy dilemma. Part VI examines primary concerns regarding MRAs in terms of power
asymmetries, concerns that apply to all global and transnational governance
mechanisms so that evaluations should be comparative in practice. Part VII
concludes by showing how MRAs provide a lens for assessing the overall global
administrative law project.
II
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AS CONSENSUAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY: MUTUAL
RECOGNITION, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND HARMONIZATION
Mutual recognition regimes are at the core of the sovereignty-globalization
nexus. As a result, a better understanding of the norm of mutual recognition
provides a lens through which to view the landscape of global administrative
law as a whole. This lens, however, forces questions regarding any sharp distinction between “domestic” and “international” bodies of law and levels of enforcement. Mutual recognition consists instead in intermingling domestic laws
in order to constitute the global. In fact, mutual recognition may be the foremost legal incarnation of what Kant referred to as cosmopolitan law—that is,
the law that exists between domestic and international law, the law that defines
the obligations of a state regarding citizens of other states.6
As a result, mutual recognition regimes are key to any global administrative
law regime. Rather than conceptualize governance in terms of a national versus
6. See IMMANUEL KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983).

PEACE
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global dichotomy, mutual recognition represents the operation of a third, ‘middle way’ of transnational economic governance, one that is already happening
in a global economic order—that of recogniting foreign regulatory determinations implicit in the import of traded goods and services. Mutual recognition
principles constitute an extension of the territorial principle of national treatment, and a cooperative, “mutualized” approach to the inherent demand for,
and challenge of, extraterritoriality in a global economic order. How so?
A. Cooperative vs. Unilateral Extraterritoriality: Mutual Recognition as a
Cosmopolitan Form of Extraterritorial Law
Recognition creates extraterritoriality. In the diplomatic world, this happens in a minimalist guise through the establishment of embassies as extraterritorial islands of home country sovereignty in the host state. But when one examines states’ recognition of what the others do, rather than of their respective
existence and boundaries, the islands of extraterritoriality are larger and more
pervasive.7 In fact, they cannot be thought of as islands anymore, but more
aptly as rivers and streams flowing from one domestic legal landscape to another. While mutual recognition is an expression of the broader category of
“extraterritoriality,” it is not extraterritoriality of a “unilateralist” (or “imperial”) bent, but rather extraterritoriality applied in a consensual or at least bi- or
plurilateral, “other-regarding” manner.
The United States is best known for applying its law “extraterritorially” in a
unilateral manner, from the Helms-Burton Act regarding investments in Cuba,8
to the sanctions applied in response to European assistance for the Soviet oil
pipeline,9 to the application of U.S. securities and antitrust law to conduct
abroad, as in the Hartford Fire Insurance case.10 The United States has typically
applied its law without engaging in any collaboration or coordination whatsoever. The Hartford Fire case, for example, was brought by U.S. private com7. Questions regarding mutual recognition are not confined to issues related to transnational
regulatory interdependence. On the contrary, mutual recognition is a norm that pervades international
relations, starting with the basic prerequisite of relations between states: their mutual recognition qua
states within a system in which, at least theoretically, such recognition implies privileges and obligations. Negotiations over such mutual recognition are often protracted. Witness the negotiations over
recognition between what used to be two Germanies, between the two sides of Europe at Helsinki, between Israel and Palestine, or between northern and southern Cyprus.
8. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act Of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), 22
U.S.C. § 6082 (2005).
9. For a more complete description and analysis of these sanctions, see Harold G. Maier, Interest
Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 580 n.3 (1983).
10. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). For a discussion of the extraterritoriality of securities law, see Oversight by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission of U.S. Securities
Markets and Issues of Internationalization and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 29 INT’L LAW. 731 (1995).
For a discussion of the extraterritoriality of antitrust law and the Hartford Fire Insurance case, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case” 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 42 (1995); Philip R. Trimble, The Supreme
Court and International Law, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53 (1995); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of
American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 750 (1995).
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mercial parties before U.S. courts regarding conduct that was apparently legal
under the regulatory system of the United Kingdom. Moreover, unilaterally determined trade sanctions typically affect third parties who are not the primary
targets of the legislation, as in the Helms-Burton Act, in which the primary target has been the Cuban government, not European and Canadian companies.
The United States acts unilaterally not only because its national political and
judicial processes determine that such action is necessary to protect its overall
security and constituent interests, but because it holds the power to do so.
Mutual recognition, in contrast, represents a form of managed “joint governance” of extraterritoriality. In calling for participating states or jurisdictions
to recognize their respective norms, rules, and standards as valid in each other’s
territory, it represents a search for a more effective division of labor, not between a global center and the periphery (or a hegemonic state and peripheral
states), but between regulators and lawmakers across countries through relatively more optimal combinations of home—and host—country control. It reflects not a force outside all (or most) states to which they have become subject,
but a proactive political choice to institutionalize and “mutualize” extraterritoriality. It constitutes a reciprocal allocation of jurisdictional authority to prescribe and to enforce. As a result, when applied to the recognition of education,
skills, and professional qualifications, it means that individuals are no longer
prisoners of their original polity and can choose to live among a variety of polities, even while physically staying in one territory. While relying on the passport of home laws and regulations, citizens are also granted a new form of social
contract that includes the—still limited—right to choose among those different
national polities (such as among the nations in the European space). The E.U.,
in light of its own internal developments, has advanced this more cooperative
form of extraterritoriality.
From the point of view of domestic regulatory authorities, a unilateral policy
choice nonetheless needs to be made to implement a mutual recognition regime. The domestic authority must determine whether it should recognize a
given non-domestic standard, and thus implicitly incorporate it as equivalent or
compatible with the domestic system’s requirements. This determination is
made, however, in a cooperative context. Two or more parties must agree over
standardization and/or mutual recognition and over how the agreement will be
implemented. National regulators must ensure that the process justifies the effective externalization or de-nationalization of law and standard-making processes, yet that they do so within a collaborative framework. Decisions to extraterritorialize their and their counterpart’s laws are the threads that make the
fabric of global administrative law. But are these always consciously made decisions?
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B. Extending vs. Denying Recognition: Mutual Recognition and National
Treatment
Mutual recognition is not always the result of a decision, the end product of
a negotiation between states and other concerned actors. Mutual recognition
by default and its extraterritorial effects are everywhere in today’s partially
globalized world. The question faced by a decisionmaker, if there is a decision
to make, is not only whether mutual recognition should be extended where it
doesn’t hold, but also whether mutual recognition should be denied where it has
reigned supreme.
Mutual recognition operates frequently outside of formal agreements between countries. Trade has always been synonymous with the movement of
goods and services produced under home rules of production that were recognized implicitly. For example, there was no need for a mutual recognition
agreement to accept that Mexican imports into the United States were produced under less stringent labor laws or that Korean computer chips were produced under less demanding environmental laws. These home laws were accepted through the very fact of import. As depicted in Graph 1 (summarizing
the traditional territorial model) this approach was consistent with a territorial
model of administration whereby the home country regulated production processes in the home country, while the host country regulated the characteristics
of the product that would be directly “encountered” by the consumer or client,
typically pursuant to the national treatment principle. In other words, unilateral recognition lies at the heart of trade and thus of any transnational administrative law regime.
Today, however, there are two movements in opposite directions respecting
recognition, both implicitly reflecting, in contrasting ways, the extraterritorial
application of laws and regulations. In some areas, mutual recognition is being
extended where national (territorial) treatment used to prevail, whereas in
other areas mutual recognition is now questioned where it had been the rule
(Graph 2). This story can be told through examining the relationship between
the principles of national treatment and mutual recognition. At first sight, national treatment and mutual recognition constitute contrasting conceptual pillars of transnational administrative law. As a minimal constraint on importing
states, the national treatment principle is protective of sovereignty since, in general terms, it provides that a host state is only prohibited from applying discriminatory standards to foreign products and services, and is otherwise free to
set the standards that it deems appropriate. The host state may thus deny the
marketing of a product or service if it does not meet its own national criteria.
Under the mutual recognition principle, in contrast, the host state is typically
obligated to accept home state standards, subject to any agreed conditions. The
relationship among home and host states under these principles is depicted in
Graphs 1 and 2 of Table 1.
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Table 1
Graph 1:
Trade, regulation and territoriality:
The traditional model for regulation of products and modes of production

Enforced In:

Rules Of:
HOST
HOME
(Importing
(Exporting
Country)
Country)
HOST
(Importing
Country)

Sovereign
Control

HOME
(Exporting
Country)

Sovereign
Control

1. Laws and regulations affecting the characteristics of products (goods and services) sold
in the importing country, e.g.
food safety standards
2. Laws, policies and regulations affecting modes of production in exporting country,
e.g. labor rights

Graph 2:
Towards “legitimate differences”:
The two way erosion of economic sovereignty

Enforced In:

Rules of:
HOST
HOME
(Importing
(Exporting
Country)
Country)
Extra
territorial
control

HOST
(Importing
Country)

1. Recognition of home state
laws affecting characteristics of
products as a means to lower
technica barriers to trade (ex;
expansion of national treatment of E.U. and WTO

Minimal harmonization?
HOME
(Exporting
Country)

Extra
territorial
control

2. Extraterritorial application
of host country rules as a condition of import (WTO)
trade/environment classes;
proposed social clause re labor
standards

Minimal harmonization?

In practice, however, the application of these two approaches—mutual recognition and national treatment—involves a continuum. In some areas (such as
consumer protection standards), national treatment and host state sovereignty
have been the norm, and mutual recognition an exception that is determined on
an ad hoc, product-by-product, or sector-by-sector basis. Distinct MRAs have
been negotiated for distinct products, services and sectors. However, in other
areas, mutual recognition of product standards was initially applied as an ex-
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pansive interpretation of the national treatment principle. The Cassis de Dijon
case decided by the European Court of Justice is likely the best known example. In that case the court held Germany must recognize French standards for
marketing the aperitif cassis (and thus could not ban the French imports on
consumer protection grounds) because Germany could satisfy its objectives
through the less trade-restrictive alternative of labelling.11 In the international
context, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) can be read as
codifications of an expansive application of national treatment. In the EC–Meat
Hormones case, the WTO Appellate Body determined that WTO rules required the E.U. to accept U.S. hormone-treated beef even though the production of such beef was banned within the E.U.12 Similarly, in the EC–Sardines
case, the Appellate Body held the E.U. had to permit the labelling for the E.U.
market of a fish caught in the Pacific Ocean and sold from Peru as “sardines,”
even though the E.U. regulation banning such labelling was neutral on its face.13
In these two cases, the mutual recognition principle operated in complement
with “voluntary” international standards adopted by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission. The Codex standards may be voluntary, but, under the SPS and
TBT agreements, a host state has an increased burden to justify its regulatory
measures as necessary when they do not meet these standards, even though the
state’s regulatory standards are non-discriminatory on their face.
In other areas, in contrast, mutual recognition has been the norm and is now
being called into question. For example, under the former GATT regime,
GATT panels determined that countries could not prohibit the importation of a
product based on how it was produced. In the famous U.S. Tuna–Dolphin
cases, two GATT panels held the United States was not permitted to ban tuna
imports because the tuna had been caught with a technique that killed a large
number of dolphins, one the United States had banned for its own fishing
fleets.14 In other words, for production processes, the mutual recognition prin11. The European Court of Justice, in its Cassis de Dijon ruling of 1979, broadly interpreted article
28 (then article 30) of the Treaty Establishing the EC to cover non-discriminatory regulatory barriers to
trade. This case is often the reference used for defining mutual recognition. See Case 120/78, ReweZentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] E.C.R. 649, para. 14, (1979) 3
C.M.L.R. 494, 510 (1979).
12. Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
13. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities–Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/. (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). The E.U. regulation maintained that only the
species Sardina pilchardus Walbaum could be marketed in the E.U. under the name “sardines.” The
species Saridina pilchardus swims in European waters and is largely fished by E.U. vessels. Because of
the E.U. regulation, fish species such as Sardinops sagax sagax which inhabits the Pacific Ocean could
not be sold under the name “sardines” in the E.U. market. See Gregory Shaffer & Victor Mosoti, EC
Sardines: A New Model For Collaboration In Dispute Settlement?, BRIDGES, Oct. 2002, at 15.
14. The United States, however, effectively blocked adoption of these panel reports. See GATT
Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions On Imports Of Tuna, 30 ILM 1594, 1620 (1991)
(unadopted panel report, Aug. 16, 1991); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions
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ciple was the presumption, and was subject to only limited exceptions.15 The
presumption of mutual recognition was denied, however, in the U.S. Shrimp–
Turtle case, in which the WTO Appellate Body ultimately decided the United
States could ban the import of shrimp caught without the turtle-protective devices prescribed by the United States, subject to conditions examined below.16
The situation is even more complex in the context of the movement of persons, as in mode IV of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) concerning the movement of persons from a home state to provide
services in a host state.17 Such services raise the issue as to what law applies to
regulate a factor of production (labor) that involves a home state worker temporarily transferred to a host country to provide a service. For example, what
labor law applies when construction companies enter into turnkey contracts in
which they supply the entire workforce, as from China? To what extent does
one differentiate if the worker stays one week or one year? Where does one
draw the line? Such a decision involves issues of recognition, confidence, fundamental rights, and exceptions to the recognition of foreign law on grounds of
social peace.
In sum, mutual recognition principles implicitly apply to both traded goods
and underlying production processes. In this way, they engage traditional
“trade” issues (e.g., technical standards), so-called “trade and . . .” issues (e.g.,
differential labor and environmental standards linked to the production process), and new issues arising in relation to the transnational provision of services.
As host state regulators move to scrutinize production “processes” as opposed
to only “product” risks, trade policies intersect with an increasing number of
regulatory domains. The ways in which states balance trade liberalization and
sovereignty and social policy concerns through applying mutual recognition and
on Imports of Tuna, , 33 ILM 839, 899 (1994) (unadopted panel report, June 16, 1994). See also overview in Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons:
What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO INT’L ENVTL, L. REV. 1 (1999).
15. For example, the GATT makes express exceptions for products produced with prison labor
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 81 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
Article XX(e)), and products produced in violation of domestic intellectual property rights (GATT Article XX(d)).
16. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct 22, 2001), availale at http://docsonline.wto.org/. The devices,
referred to as “turtle excluder devices” (or TEDs), are a mechanism that permits turtles to escape from
shrimp trawling nets to avoid drowning. See Sabino Cassese, Shrimp, Turtles, and Procedures: Global
Standards for National Administrations, in this symposium issue; Gregory Shaffer, United States–Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 507 (1999); Gregory Shaffer,
Power, Global Governance and the WTO: The Need for a Comparative Institutional Approach, in
POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, eds., 2005).
17. General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services, 33 I.L.M. 46 (1994). As
stated in a note by the WTO secretariat, “Mode 4” consists of services involving “the admission of foreign nationals to another country to provide services there. Mode 4 may also be found alone, with no
permanent commercial presence, and the visiting persons involved may be employees of a foreign service supplier, or may be providing services as independent individuals.” See WTO Secretariat Trade in
Services Division, An Introduction to the GATS (October 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm.
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national treatment principles to products and production processes thus lies
along a continuum.
C. The Crucial Distinction between Underlying Standards and “Conformity
Assessment” Procedures: From “Traditional” to “Enhanced” MRAs?
Analysts usually fail to give adequate prominence to a third, equally important distinction—that between substantive regulatory standards and “conformity assessment” systems. Conformity assessment systems address the conformity of a product with the applicable substantive standard. In addition to
enforcing substantive regulations, governments require that exporters comply
with various certification procedures—e.g., certification for goods, licensing for
professionals, controls for manufacturing processes, and financial supervision
for banks. Under conformity assessment procedures, public regulatory authorities, or (increasingly) quasi-public or private entities to which authority has
been delegated, assess and enforce conformity with underlying substantive
standards. Thus, regardless of the standards applied to a product in the host
state, some entity (whether a public agency, a public-private hybrid, a private
entity, or the company itself under a self-regulatory regime) is responsible for
assessing and (possibly) certifying the conformity of the product with such standards. This distinction between standards and conformity assessment lies at the
core of MRAs.18
When it comes to underlying standards, standardization and recognition can
be used alternatively, or, as is often the case, in combination. Mutual recognition regimes may, for example, be linked to harmonized standards.19 Mutual
recognition regimes may more likely flourish if regulatory officials operate under procedures and standards with which they are familiar and if they trust review and monitoring of the regime’s application is ongoing. International standards can facilitate the negotiation of bilateral mutual recognition agreements
because, when parties operate under common standards and procedures, they
more easily understand and develop trust in each other’s regulatory practices to
enforce these standards.20 Sustained transnational engagement among public
18. The TBT Agreement, for example, recognizes this key distinction. Articles 2-4 of the TBT
Agreement address “technical regulations and standards,” while articles 5-9 cover “conformity with
technical regulations and standards” (that is, conformity assessment procedures). Technical Barriers to
Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, Hein’s No. KAV 3778, at cxliii.
19. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: Some Lessons and
Prospects, in Regulatory Reform and International Market Openness, OECD Publications, (1996),
reprinted in (Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 7, 1997) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.),
available at http://www.jeanmonnet program.org/papers/97/97-07.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
20. For example, the 1997 U.S.–E.U. Mutual Recognition Agreement is based largely on the mutual recognition of test results by “Conformity Assessment Bodies,” which, in turn, are evaluated pursuant to international standards set forth in ISO/IEC Guides. The international standard-setting bodies
relevant to the sectors covered by the transatlantic mutual recognition agreements include the International Standards Organization (ISO) (for a broad range of standards), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (for testing and certification standards), Codex Alimentarius (for food-related
standards), the International Conference on Harmonization (for pharmaceutical standards); the Global
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and private actors spurred by mutual recognition agreements can also facilitate
an ongoing adaptation and possible convergence of regulatory procedures and
standards through increased mutual familiarity ex-post, rather than harmonization ex-ante.
Although standardization of assessment procedures may sometimes be a
prerequisite, it is not in itself sufficient. Some form of recognition of foreign
conformity assessment procedures is the only mechanism for liberalization.21
For this reason, MRAs initially targeted conformity assessment systems rather
than underlying standards.
In negotiating MRAs, states face a fundamental initial choice regarding
which standards to apply—those of the home or of the host state. They can engage upfront in an evaluation process which determines whether their different
regulatory systems are comparable and their standards are functionally equivalent. If so, each host state could effectively recognize the other (home) state’s
standards as equivalent. Home state standards would thus apply to both products consumed within it and products exported to the host state. Alternatively,
states could agree that each regulatory system will recognize only its own standards, but that certification, monitoring, and enforcement of such (host state)
standards will take place primarily in the exporting (home) state. In this case,
conformity assessment would be regulated by the home state, but the home
state conformity assessment body would assess or certify a product’s conformity
with host state standards.
From a political economy perspective, conformity assessment without the
recognition of home and host state standards as equivalent can be costly. Assessors and certifiers must be trained to assess separate standards for each jurisdiction instead of a single one, complicating their mission. Enterprises must
incur the cost of redundant testing under home and host state standards for
these separate markets—even if MRAs authorize the very same authorities to
do the testing. In other words, the better division of labor that was sought
through mutual recognition, saving host enforcers from redundant controls,
may have been only a mirage since the work of “adapting to diversity” has now
been thrust on the home state regulator, who, in turn, externalizes this cost to
firms. Moreover, enterprises may also have to assume the cost of having to cre-

Harmonization Task Force (for medical device standards), and the International Maritime Organization (for marine safety standards). Codex Alimentarius, a joint undertaking of the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization, is relevant to the U.S.–E.U. Veterinary
Equivalence Agreement. This latter agreement is not yet operational and is not covered in this Article.
The International Conference on Harmonization is a program that “harmonizes requirements and
guidelines for testing drugs and biologies.” Its members are the Commission, the European Medicines
Evaluation Agency, E.U. member state regulators, Japan’s health ministry and U.S. European and
Japanese pharmaceutical trade industry associations. See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 692, 717-18 (1998). The Global Harmonization
Task Force consists of regulators from the United States, EC, Canada, Japan and Australia, although
the Task Force now admits observers from many other countries.
21. This being said, one could eventually envisage the creation of supranational agencies responsible for conformity assessment or for overseeing and monitoring its delegation.
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ate separate production lines so that products conform to these distinct standards.
As a result of its experience with conformity assessment under a number of
MRAs—in particular, the 1997 U.S.–E.U. MRA—the European Commission
published a paper in August 2004 that assessed lessons it had drawn. The
Commission made a distinction between “traditional” MRAs, which focus on
the mutual recognition of conformity assessment certifications without aligning
relevant standards and “enhanced” agreements, which are based on standards
deemed to be equivalent to each other or, even better, on common standards.22
The Commission concluded that the “traditional” form of MRA has proven unattainable. These conclusions may, of course, change over time, based on new
experience. They do, however, need to be taken into account when evaluating
cost constraints on the “supply” of mutual recognition regimes.
The crucial point is not that harmonization or convergence is inevitable or
desirable. Rather, mutual recognition is relevant to two categories of governance: the content or substance of rules and the application or enforcement of
rules. While. for the first category, options for transnational administrative law
range from full harmonization to full recognition, there is no such choice in the
latter category. Short of the unlikely move of setting up a world enforcement
agency, the only alternative to the “when in Rome” principle for a functioning
transnationally integrated economy is mutual recognition.
To summarize, mutual recognition constitutes a reciprocal, negotiated, and
institutionalized form of extraterritoriality. As such, it must be contrasted both
with national treatment and with harmonization as the two alternative paradigms for managing transnational economic relations on regulatory matters.
There is no question, however, as to which approach is more or less demanding.
Clearly, extraterritoriality, even of the consensual kind, promises a world that is
more complex to navigate than the prevailing territorial order. As a matter of
fact, however, this new world is already with us and must be examined with fine
lenses. Table 2 summarizes the similarities and differences between national
treatment, harmonization, and mutual recognition approaches, on the one hand,
and between the application of standardization and conformity assessment approaches, on the other.

22. Taken from Commission Staff Working Paper: Priorities for Bilateral/Regional trade related
activities in the field of Mutual Recognition Agreements for industrial products and related technical
dialogue, SEC (Aug. 25, 2004) 1072/1 (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at:
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/ st13/st13616.en04.pdf. (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
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Table 2
Alternative combinations of principles underpinning
Mutual Recognition regimes
Standards vs. Conformity Assessment
Standards

Home country

Conformity
Assessment

Host country

Host
Tradt’l
MRAs

Home
EU/90s Enhanced
MRAs

EU/70s WTO
norm

Harmonized
Form of Enhanced MRAs

Int’l standards

National Treatment, Harmonization and Mutual Recognition

•

Single rule?

NT

H

•

From firm viewpoint

NO

YES

•

From systematic viewpoint

NO

YES

•

Within jurisdiction

YES

YES
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III
MUTUAL RECOGNITION REGIMES: STRUCTURE, SUBJECT MATTER, ACTORS
A. Structural Analysis: Horizontal and Vertical Components of Transnational
Mutual Recognition
Traditional conceptions of global governance tend to simplify governance
into categories of local, state, regional, and global institutions along a vertical
axis of ‘multi-level’ governance. They thus tend to de-emphasize transnational
mechanisms of horizontally allocated authority among and between states.
Structurally, mutual recognition regimes involve both horizontal and vertical relations among global, transnational, and national institutions, but they concentrate on the horizontal allocation of authority, thus avoiding the pitfalls of
‘global’ governance, and, in particular, the lack of a democratically legitimate
global center with anything resembling a functioning legislature. Mutual recognition regimes, however, can also set in place autonomous mechanisms at the
supranational level overseeing national decisionmaking, thereby implicating
vertical relations among global, transnational, and national legal regimes. Supranational institutions can set the standards and procedures for recognition,
adjudicate the implementation of the regime, and provide global certification of
local assessment bodies operating under the regime. Nonetheless, by coordinating state level administrative action and creating constraints on home and host
states, mutual recognition regimes can primarily be viewed as a legalized form
of horizontal cooperation. They institutionalize and deepen forms of recognition that already happen implicitly when products are traded.
Mutual recognition regimes thus involve each of the five main types of
global administrative law typologized in the framing paper by Kingsbury et al,
even though that paper explicitly identifies MRAs in terms of the second and
(tentatively) third types only. They do so in the following ways:
1. International Administration
Mutual recognition regimes often provide for international administration,
political oversight, or legal review of the arrangement. In the European Union,
the mutual recognition principle is embedded in numerous E.U. directives and
regulations in accordance with the Treaty Establishing the European Community; the European Commission oversees its implementation and the European
Court of Justice adjudicates and enforces its application. Chapter 9 of NAFTA
likewise includes provisions incorporating mutual recognition principles and
specifically provides for recognition of the parties’ conformity assessment bodies.23 At the international level, WTO members have signed agreements calling
23. NAFTA, article 908, provides: “[E]ach Party shall accredit, approve, license or otherwise recognize conformity assessment bodies in the territory of another Party on terms no less favorable than
those accorded to conformity assessment bodies in its territory.” North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993), at 388. Article 904.4 addresses the impact of national standards of the host
country on products from the home country. It provides: “No Party may prepare, adopt, maintain or
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for bilateral and plurilateral negotiation of MRAs.24 The WTO also sets rules
that constrain the adoption of mutual recognition agreements, in particular,
those that discriminate against other WTO members (for example, Article I of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,25 as well as the most-favorednation provisions in other WTO agreements). Any such discrimination is subject to challenge before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Similarly, a number of WTO agreements and rules have been interpreted in a manner that advances mutual recognition principles, as in the EC-meat hormones and ECsardines decisions noted above.26
2. Transnational Network Administration
Administration by transnational networks of regulatory officials is the basis
for administering mutual recognition regimes. Host states must accept products
and services from home states, subject to negotiated administrative procedures
and ongoing monitoring mechanisms involving networks of home and host state
regulatory officials. Through these mechanisms, host states can be reassured
that the regulations prevailing in the home states are not downgraded to a level
incompatible with the initial bargain. Mechanisms for redress when consumers
have been harmed are also set in place. In short, transnational administration
serves primarily to alleviate fears of a “race to the bottom” or “legal dumping”
under MRAs.
3. Distributive National Administration
Mutual recognition regimes are sustained through a form of distributed administration in which each state (or non-state) party is responsible for transactions occurring, in part, outside of its territory. They must therefore take into
account the impact of the administration’s rules and decisions on constituents in
the other’s jurisdiction. Home state officials are to take account of the protection of consumers in the host state. Host state officials are to take account of
the impact of their decisions on producers and service providers from the home
state. Home and host state officials are spurred to cooperate in order to ensure
that this distribution of administrative functions protects the constituents to
whom they are most directly responsible.

apply any standards-related measure with a view to or with the effect of creating an unnecessary
obstacle to trade between the Parties.” Id. at 387. Since most regulations affect trade, the key issue
becomes whether the national standard is “necessary” for the pursuit of an objective that is not
adequately ensured by the home states’ regulatory system. Such legal provisions can facilitate a
managed form of mutual recognition.
24. See, e.g., Article 6 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Article 7 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services). Article 7 of GATS encourages signatories to adopt measures, by
way of bilateral agreements or autonomously, “to recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certification obtained in a particular country.” See Kalypso Nicolaidis &
Joel P. Trachtman, From Policed Regulation to Managed Recognition: Mapping the Boundary in
GATS, in GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION, (Pierre Sauve &
Robert M. Stern, eds., 2000), citing GATS Annex 1B.
25. See GATT, supra note 15.
26. See Appellate Body, supra notes 12 and 13.
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4. Hybrid Intergovernmental-Private Administration
Hybrid public-private administration is widespread in mutual recognition
regimes, which can involve the outsourcing of monitoring, certification, and assessment functions. For example, in the U.S.–E.U. “safe harbour” negotiations
over the recognition of privacy standards, the E.U. member states’ data privacy
authorities met with BBB OnLine, a private U.S. entity, to see how its certification works within the U.S. context. When European authorities became more
comfortable with U.S. oversight mechanisms that involve private entities
backed by potential enforcement by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, they
agreed to the transatlantic Safe Harbor understanding.27 Even in formally transgovernmental regimes, the law-in-action of mutual recognition can involve intensive interaction of public-private networks. Private actors are often the primary demanders of the regime, as the telecommunications industry has been
regarding the telecommunications MRAs existing today.28 Consumer groups
and businesses unhappy with the operation of MRAs are likewise the primary
providers of information to governments to challenge the regime’s implementation.
5. Private Administration
Many mutual recognition regimes effectively involve forms of selfregulation. Private bodies themselves can either enter into mutual recognition
regimes or be the main implementers of the regimes. For example, private
groups may negotiate contracts for joint seal programs in other jurisdictions,
such as that concluded in 2001 between BBB OnLine and a Japanese counterpart involving the certification of companies’ online privacy practices.29 In this
way, on-line businesses can meet criteria in multiple jurisdictions without the
need for drawn-out treaty negotiations.

27. See Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Roles: The Prospects and Limits of New
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 68 (2002).
28. The telecommunications industry, for example, has sought MRAs for lucrative markets in Asia
and Latin America, which U.S. and E.C. authorities have signed through APEC and CITEL,
respectively. APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, promotes open trade and economic
cooperation among APEC’s twenty-one member ‘economies’ around the Pacific Rim. See
http://www.apec.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2005). CITEL is “an entity of the Organization of American
States, is the main forum in the hemisphere in which the governments and the private sector meet to
coordinate regional efforts to develop the Global Information Society according to the mandates of the
General Assembly of the Organization and the mandates entrusted to it by Heads of State and
Government at the Summits of the Americas.” See http://www.citel.oas.org/. (last visited Jan. 11,
2005). Telecommunications was also at the center of the 1997 U.S.–E.U. MRA.
29. The Japanese counterpart is JIPDEC, a public–private body working with the Japanese
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Telephone Interview of Shaffer with Gary Laden, Director BBB
OnLine Privacy Program (June 6, 2001). The seal designates that the web site is subject to the rules
and monitoring of the third-party organization, in this case BBB OnLine in the United States.
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B. Subject Areas for Mutual Recognition Regimes
Mutual recognition is a principle that may be applied to services as well as to
products, and to professional services in particular. In the E.U. context, the
principle has been applied to a vast number of sectors, from toys to telecoms,
finance to architects, doctors to accountants. Similarly, internationally, the E.U.
has announced that it “has negotiated or is in the process of negotiating [MR]
agreements with about 38 third countries.”30 In 1997 it negotiated an MRA with
the United States in six sectors, including pharmaceuticals, medical devices, recreational craft, and telecommunications. It has proven impossible, however, to
expand this approach to services in which individual states in the United States
wield most regulatory power.31 About half of the MRAs notified to the WTO,
in contrast, concern professional services, such as accountants, engineers, or architects.32
Recognition-type arrangements are also applied in areas other than in trade.
For example, recognition issues may arise in the handling of conflicts over
which substantive law to apply under the jurisdictional principle of “objective
territoriality”—more commonly known as the “effects doctrine”—as applied in
particular in antitrust and securities law. The principle of “comity” operates as
a counter to the extraterritorial application of national law in such cases.
“Comity” concerns “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws.”33 Under this principle, courts may decline to rule on a case in deference to another forum with
greater interests in, and links to, the dispute.34 Administrative agencies may also
30. See SEC, supra note 22.
31. The E.U. reports that it has concluded seven Mutual Recognition Agreements on conformity
assessment between the European Community and third countries: on 1/12/98 with the United States
(Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and the United States of America. 1999 O.J. (L 31) 3); on 1/11/98 with Canada (Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and Canada, 1998 O.J. (L 280) 3); on 1/1/99 with Australia (Agreement on mutual
recognition in relation to conformity assessment, certificates and markings between the European
Community and Australia, 1998 O.J. (L 229) 3; New Zealand (Agreement on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment between the European Community and New Zealand, 1998 O.J. (L
229) 62); on 1/1/02 with Japan (Agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community
and Japan, 2001 O.J. (L 284) 3); on 1/5/00 with Israel in the Sector of Chemicals Good Laboratory Practices (GLP), (Agreement on mutual recognition of OECD principles of good laboratory practice
(GLP) and compliance monitoring programmes between the European Community and the State of
Israel, 1999 O.J. (L 263) 7); and 1/6/02 with Switzerland (Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, 2002 O.J.
(L 114) 369). See Mutual Recognition Agreements (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international/indexb1.htm#intro (last visited Jan. 11, 2005). See
also Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals, supra note 27, at 36.
32. According to the WTO’s website, as of February 24, 2005, WTO members had notified 47
MRAs (regarding goods) to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and 48 MRAs (regarding
services) to the Council for Trade in Services.
33. BLACKS’ LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
34. For an application, see for example Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.,
549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir., 1976) (“[T]here is the additional question which is unique to the interna-
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create “positive comity” arrangements, as did the United States and E.U. in the
competition field in the 1990s. Such an arrangement “enables one side adversely affected by anticompetitive conduct carried out in the other’s territory
to request the other party’s competition authority to take enforcement action.”35
In this way, host state administrative and judicial bodies may mutually defer to
application by their counterparts in another jurisdiction (the home state) of that
state’s law and regulatory regime. Similarly, courts engage in mutual recognition when states agree to recognize and enforce judgments from each other’s jurisdictions, whether in a civil, commercial, or penal matter, as now codified in
an E.U. regulation and a number of treaties.36 Judges have also created and participated in transnational networks of exchange with their foreign counterparts
to facilitate mutual learning and cooperation when common and overlapping
cases arise.37 This judicial exchange can facilitate recognition of each other’s
judgments.
C. The Actors
States are typically the parties to MRAs, and state representatives typically
play the leading roles in negotiating and implementing MRAs. Yet the negotiation and implementation of MRAs also highlight the disaggregated nature of
the state in the modern era.38 The 1997 U.S.-E.U. MRA negotiations required
the involvement of multiple state agencies since the negotiations comprised a
framework agreement with annexes covering six separate regulatory sectors.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Commission’s
Trade Directorate-General (DG) led the negotiations of the MRA framework

tional setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United States—including the magnitude of
the effect on American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong vis-à-vis those of other nations, to
justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”).
35. Youri Devuyst, Transatlantic Competition Relations, in, Transatlantic Governance in the
Global Economy 127, 135-36 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, eds., 2001).
36. See Commission Regulation 44/2001, 1971 O.J. (L 12) 1. See also Convention on International
Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, The Hague (Feb. 1, 1971)
(on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=
conventions.text&cid=78 last visited Apr. 12, 2005); Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1968 O.J. (C 027) 1 ; Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Rome (June 19, 1980), 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980); Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Lugano (Sept. 16,
1988) 28 I.L.M 623 (1989); and Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, Brussels (May 28, 1998) (1998 O.J. (C 221)), a modification of the
1968 Brussels Convention that adds judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental
responsibility.
37. See Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue
in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L. J.; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104 (2000) (“Judicial globalization . . . describes a much more
diverse and messy process of judicial interaction across, above and below borders, exchanging ideas and
cooperating in cases involving national as much as international law.”); see also Paul Schiff Berman,
The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Paul Schiff Bermann, Towards a
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflicts of Law: Re-Defining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
38. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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agreement.39 Each of the annexes, however, was negotiated by the regulatory
agency or agencies responsible for the sector concerned. On the European side,
this process was simpler because of the centralization of the responsible agency
officials within the Commission’s DG Enterprise and these officials’ long experience with coordinating the twin goals of regulatory protection and free
trade within the single market. On the U.S. side, in contrast, separate independent federal agencies negotiated the annexes. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) handled the telecommunications and electromagnetic
compatibility annexes; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), a division of the Department of Labor, negotiated the electrical safety
annex; the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) negotiated the annexes for
medical devices and pharmaceutical good manufacturing practices; and the
Coast Guard oversaw the recreational craft annex.
However, while some sectors were mostly governed by one agency (e.g., the
FDA for pharmaceuticals), others were characterized by a plethora of accreditation and certification bodies. More often than not, authority has been delegated in these areas not only to autonomous public agencies, but to private certification bodies that may compete with one another. Precisely because of this
fragmentation, the E.U. was concerned, when negotiating with the United
States, about potential U.S. defections after signing the agreement. It therefore
insisted that, even though some of the relevant regulating bodies may be private, the ultimate commitments must be made by states. Because the United
States lacked a coordinated system of accredited testing and certification laboratories, European officials were concerned about the ability of U.S. regulators
to guarantee the competence and quality of U.S. conformity assessment bodies.
In response, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, a division
of the Department of Commerce, created a new U.S. program named the National Voluntary Conformity Assessment Program. Taking from the E.U.
model, the U.S. program aims to coordinate and oversee U.S. conformity assessment bodies, and thereby provide greater confidence to regulatory officials,
whether domestic or foreign. Similarly, in the Safe Harbor negotiations over
data privacy protection, although the E.U. engaged in discussions and review of
certification procedures of private bodies, such as BBB OnLine, ultimate enforcement powers were to reside in the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.40
These developments illustrate the continued state-centric character of global
administrative law. Even when private bodies actually “do the work,” state
commitment is still what matters.

39. See Shaffer, supra note 27, at 40; Kalypso Nicolaidis & Rebecca Steffenson, Managed Mutual
Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AMID DISCORD (Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, eds, 2005).
40. Joel Reidenberg, however, questions whether the FTC actually has the powers contemplated
under the Safe Harbor agreement. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 717, 740-42 (2001).
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To understand the political economy of MRAs, one must, however, also
take account of private parties’ central bottom-up role. Private parties often lie
behind MRA negotiations themselves. For example, large businesses on each
side of the Atlantic, working under the auspices of the Transatlantic Business
Dialogue (TABD), have promoted the concept of mutual recognition agreements as a concrete policy initiative that would meet business needs.41 TABD
rapidly became an independent voice, identifying areas of concern and coordinating pressure on officials to set time tables for the signature and implementation of mutual recognition agreements.42 As Paula Stern, former chair of the
U.S. International Trade Commission and advisor to TABD, states, “TABD
quickly established the Trans-Atlantic Advisory Committee on Standards, Certification and Regulatory Policy (TACS) to formulate recommendations, organized on a sectoral basis, for the elimination of regulatory barriers between the
two economies.”43 Businesses have multiple strategies. At the domestic level,
trading firms hoped that the U.S.–E.U. MRA would promote domestic adoption of harmonized standards and deregulated certification requirements. The
main targets of these firms were U.S. independent regulatory authorities, and
they had some success. Since 1998, the FCC has instituted a program pursuant
to which private testing laboratories may certify new telecommunications
equipment, whereas, formerly, only the FCC could do so.44 Internationally,
firms also hoped that the bilateral arrangement could be a stepping stone for
reaching mutual recognition agreements with third countries, thereby offering
increased access to more markets.45
Private actors can also question or even undermine a regime’s efficacy if the
market context creates incentives to do so. Domestic firms benefit from regulatory barriers to their foreign competitors. When no domestic business constituency actively presses for domestic regulatory change, implementation of a
MRA faces greater hurdles. For example, no U.S. constituency pressed for implementation of the transatlantic electrical safety MRA.46 This would have
41. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue was launched in 1995 roughly at the time as the creation
of the New Transatlantic Agenda. As documented by Cowles, the TABD consists of CEOs of over 100
of the largest firms on each side of the Atlantic. See Maria Green Cowles, The Transatlantic Business
Dialogue: Transforming the New Transatlantic Dialogue, in Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 35, at 215.
42. To give one example of TABD’s work, see Mutual Recognition of the Food and Drug
Administration and European Community Member State Conformity Assessment Procedures;
Pharmaceutical GMP Inspection Reports, Medical Device Quality System Evaluation Reports, and
Certain Medical Device Pre market Evaluation Reports, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,744, 17,747 (proposed Apr. 10,
1998) (noting views of TABD).
43. Paula Stern, The Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue: A New Paradigm for Standards and Regulatory Reform, Sector by Sector, in OECD PROCEEDINGS: REGULATORY REFORM AND
INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS 155-56 (1996).
44. Since the MRA telecommunications and electromagnetic compatibility annexes rely on recognition of foreign Conformity Assessment Bodies, the United States needed (at a minimum) to adopt a
program permitting the use of private testing laboratories were it to enter into the MRA.
45. Telephone Interview with FCC Official (June 8, 2001).
46. The U.S. National Electrical Manufacturers Association, “which represents some 450 U.S.
companies,” initially “opposed conclusion of the electrical safety MRA.” An industry source confirms
that U.S. “companies manage to have their products tested and certified without much difficulty” and
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meant constituent pressure on OSHA to show good will towards the E.U. and
to recognize laboratories designated by E.U. member state authorities. But, as
a Commission official points out, this MRA annex was not “balanced” since
U.S.-based firms do not need conformity assessment to sell electrical safety
equipment in the E.U. market which, unlike in the U.S. market, requires third
party conformity assessment.47 Because of their experience with OSHAcertified laboratories, most U.S. producers encountered relatively less difficulty
with OSHA’s requirements for conformity assessment than their European
competitors and could thus gain an advantage. Similarly, laboratories already
certified by OSHA had a relatively protected market and would not benefit
from new competition from laboratories certified by European authorities.48
Finally, as with other trade-related matters, one must consider the role of
consumers and consumer groups in the shaping of mutual recognition regimes.
On the one hand, as with liberalization generally, consumers stand to gain from
increased competition and product choice. On the other hand, greater choice in
the market does not always compensate for the fears associated with the perceived downgrading of standards through exposure to foreign rules. Thus consumer organizations pressure politicians and regulatory agencies if they believe
that implementation of an MRA will lead to a lowering of standards. In the
United States, for instance, a number of consumer advocates, such as Public
Citizen, have distrusted MRAs because of concern over corporate influence in
their design.49 This distrust is likely to spur consumer vigilance over the implementation of any agreement.
IV
EXPLANATORY FACTORS: THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION REGIMES
With characters and set in place, this section addresses the factors that lead
to the adoption of mutual recognition as a core principle of transnational administrative law.

“that the MRA, in fact, was having little impact on the ‘day-to-day operations’ of companies that manufacture products covered under the agreement.” See Gary Yerkey, EU Set to Withdraw from Agreement with U.S. to Boost Trade in Electrical Goods, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 956 (May 30, 2002).
47. Telephone Interview with DG Enterprise Official in Brussels (June 13, 2001).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., U.S.–E.U. Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA)/Congressional Hearing (on file with
Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://www.publiccitizen.org/trade/harmonization/MRA/
articles.cfm?ID=6156 (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) (reporting on hearing before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1998)); Mary Bottari,
Peter Lurie & Sidney M. Wolfe, Public Citizen Comments on Pharmaceutical Annex to U.S.–E.U.
Mutual Recognition Agreement (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://www.publiccitizen.org/trade/harmonization/MRA/articles.cfm?ID=4302, (last visited March 10,
2002); see also Steffenson, supra note 39, at 22 (concerning reactions of the Transatlantic Consumer
Dialogue (TACD) and of the Transatlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED)). The TACD and TAEC
consist of non-governmental organizations from both sides of the Atlantic. See Francesca Bignami &
Steven Charnovitz, Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues, in Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 35, at 255.
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A. Demand and Supply Factors50
Technical barriers to trade, which MRAs are asked to surmount, may result
from domestic interest group pressures, domestic political actors advancing perceptions of the national interest and general welfare, or a combination of
these.51 The analysis here, however, focuses not on the sources of technical barriers, but rather on the ways in which they may be addressed so that trade liberalization and regulatory protection may be mutually managed.
The distinction between the demand and the supply of a regime can be
viewed roughly in terms of key actors’ perceptions of the desirability and feasibility of the regime’s implementation.52 Changes on the demand side tend to reflect changes in the value attributed to mutual recognition and standardization
in light of the perceived costs and limitations of alternative policies. Changes
on the supply side tend to reflect the calculations and degree of resistance of national regulators, industry, and consumers who must implement, operate, and
live with mutual recognition agreements and any agreed common standards.
Demand and supply factors cannot be independently specified. The same actors may be “demanders” and “suppliers” and similar factors may affect the
demand and supply side.53 However, bargaining dynamics will reflect the effects
of demand and supply factors and translate them into particular outcomes.
Through a process of “strategic spillover,” internal dynamics can generate
demand for further liberalization once MRAs are in place. For example, in the
E.U. context, demand has been generated from both internal and external E.U.
players. Internal players were keen to exploit strategic opportunities offered by
mutual recognition arrangements. The internal move created potential strategic
disadvantages for external players who demanded further liberalization, including a transatlantic MRA, to overcome them. These new mutual recognition
agreements may, in turn, place pressure on third countries to enter into negotiations so that their firms are not disadvantaged—leading to a potential “contagion effect.”54 Each MRA can thereby provide political leverage to domestic
firms to demand new MRAs with third-country counterparts to equalize market
50. This section is drawn primarly from Kalypso Nicolaidis & Michelle Egan, Regional Policy
Externality and Market Governance: Why Recognize Foreign Standards?, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 454
(2001).
51. See Peter Gourevitch, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES (1986); Peter J. Katzenstein, Conclusion:
Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY
(Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1987); Stephen D. Krasner, DEFENDING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: RAW
MATERIALS INVESTMENTS AND US FOREIGN POLICY (1978).
52. See Nicolaidis & Egan, supra note 50.
53. Robert Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 142-43
(S. Krasner, ed., 1982). When this article considers the impetus for change, on the demand side—and
resistance to change, on the supply side—it examines the role played by the same array of actors.
54. See Nicolaidis & Trachtman, supra note 24; Kalypso Nicolaidis, Non-Discriminatory Mutual
Recognition: An Oxymoron in the New WTO Lexicon? in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW: PAST AND PRESENT, JOURNAL OF
WORLD TRADE, The World Trade Forum series, (Petros Mavroidis & Patrick Blatter, eds., Univ. Mich.
Press 2000); Nicolaidis, supra note 4; Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition Among Nations,
(1993)(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University).
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access. Considerations of reciprocal market access benefits can also help to explain the structure of MRAs.55
Ultimately, however, an agreement’s likelihood and characteristics, as well
as its normative appeal, tend to depend on supply side factors—that is, on the
capacity and propensity of regulatory actors to enter the logic and constraints of
an effective mutual recognition order. The following supply factors appear to
be critical both from positive and normative perspectives:
1. Cross-national Regulatory Compatibility
The first and most obvious factor has to do with the basic question a decisionmaker asks when entering a mutual recognition agreement: Can my country live with this degree of extraterritorial law emanating from this or these specific actors? In other words: Are the systems compatible enough? Regulatory
compatibility is a function of the degree of convergence across regulatory culture, policies, and standards which affect perceptions of regulatory effectiveness. Differences in risk assessment, scientific evidence, and the goals of regulations, of course, all hinder mutual recognition. In the transatlantic context,
mechanisms for regulatory cooperation have fared less well when regulators
have not been guided by sufficiently comparable regulatory laws and cultures.56
Compatibility has played a particularly important role in the north-south context where regulatory divergences are a primary explanation for the lower likelihood of collaborative market governance mechanisms between developed and
developing countries, as well as for the frequent “lowest common denominator”
approach in international standardization to address divergent levels of “regulatory development.” In short, developed countries’ lack of trust in developing
countries’ regulatory systems explains why developed countries have been more
reticent to enter into MRAs with them. Of course, because compatibility is a
stretchable concept, it offers explanatory leverage only if measured independently from the observed outcome of recognition negotiations.
2. Domestic Level Institutional Conditions
Regulatory compatibility may be a necessary factor for the emergence of a
mutual recognition regime, but it is not a sufficient one. An explanation is
needed for the variation in mutual recognition across sectors exhibiting comparable degrees of regulatory compatibility. Negotiations are sometimes bogged
down in spite of apparent compatibility because a country’s regulatory institutions and the structure of power relationships between trade and regulatory
agencies affect the state’s propensity to recognize foreign standards, ex ante,
and to “deliver” substantial commitments, ex post. As in any complex trade
negotiation, trade negotiators act as agents for a variety of interests, including
industry, consumers, and bureaucratic and regulatory bodies responsible for the
state’s regulatory system. In the 1997 U.S.–E.U. MRA, the involvement of both
55. See Shaffer, supra note 27, at 39.
56. See Pollack & Shaffer, in Pollack and Shaffer, supra note 41, at 297-99.
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trade officials and regulatory officials resulted in intra-U.S. agency conflicts.
Trade officials more aggressively pushed for an agreement, and U.S. regulatory
officials, in particular the FDA and OSHA, were reticent about accepting foreign certification of safety standards, making actual delivery problematic.
These agencies obstructed implementation of the MRA where they believed
that their regulatory missions might be compromised.57 In addition, consumer
organizations in the United States tend to show greater distrust of MRAs that
involve cooperation with foreign regulatory officials and private or quasi-public
certifiers because, in the U.S. context, private actors lack the tradition of cooperating with regulatory authorities that exists in more corporatist, state-directed
European systems.58 Ultimately, those agencies and entities, public and/or private, that are accountable for ensuring domestic regulatory oversight and which
must respond to domestic pressures are best able to make commitments on
market openness that are credible.
3. Supranational and Transnational Institutional Conditions
Finally, standards problems often take the form of a “prisoner’s dilemma”
that require institutional solutions to develop mutual trust and monitoring to
ensure that countries do not defect on their commitments. This concern provides the core rationale for the “managed” character of mutual recognition.
Supranational and transnational institutional development can compensate to
some extent for gaps in transnational regulatory compatibility. Trade liberalization is facilitated if the states involved operate within a common institutional
framework for trade-oriented regulatory cooperation and dispute resolution.
Here, as elsewhere, agreement on the creation of such institutions depends on
long-term trust and short-term adoption of confidence building measures.59 Ex
ante, if regulators feel some degree of “ownership” in a regulatory or standardsetting process that occurs beyond their borders, they are more likely to accept
its validity. Ex post, if regulators can be reassured that they will be able to engage in some degree of mutual monitoring and collaborative division of labor,
they are less likely to fear an uncontrolled lowering of standards as a result of
recognition or of delegation of regulatory authority to private bodies. Since
agreements over standardization and recognition are vulnerable to conflicts of
interpretation and changes in domestic circumstances, they need to be designed
to minimize risks of disruptive conflicts, and possibly include third-party dispute
settlement mechanisms.

57. See Shaffer, supra note 27, at 40.
58. See, e.g., MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING THE EUROPEAN MARKET 131 (2001) supra
(noting that, in the United States, “the public and private sector have remained much more distinct,”
and the policy style is less “state-directed”); Robert Kagan, How Much Do National Styles of Law Matter, in REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3 (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrod eds., 2000) (noting the much more legalistic and adversarial regulatory style in the United States).
59. See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. See also DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP (1995);
GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE (1996); Nicolaidis, supra note 4.
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Table 3 summarizes the operation of the above factors in three institutional
settings—the European, transatlantic and international contexts.
60

Table 3
Explanatory Factors for standardization
and mutual recognition across three contexts
European Cooperation (re: standards
and conformity assessment)

Transatlantic Cooperation (re: conformity assessment)

International Cooperation (re: standards)

Country-specific capacity to deliver
(private regulatory
accountability &
public regulatory
autonomy)

Private bodies made
accountable through
notification

Very asymmetric.
High in the EU. Low
in the United States
given lack of accountability and high
autonomy.

Widespread
differences.

Cross-national regulatory compatibility

Generally high by the
1980s but for conformity assessment procedures.

Lower than within the
E.U. but not insurmountable.

Widespread
differences.

Some pre-existing
sectoral cooperation.
Incentives to build
mutual monitoring
capacity as “confidence building measures.” Relatively
weak dispute settlement procedures.

High transaction
costs of building
monitoring networks. Voluntary
compliance, with no
obligation to use international standards, although
WTO SPS and TBT
agreements create
incentives to use
them.

Contexts:
Factors:

Transnational institutional foundation

Pre-existing mutual
monitoring techniques. Formation of
EOTC. Sanctions for
non-compliance. Enforcement by Commission and European Court of Justice.

How have each of these factors played out in the contexts described above?
In a nutshell, mutual recognition has not only been a hallmark of the E.U. single market since the early 1980s but is arguably a modus operandi for the E.U.
as a whole.61 The high degree of transnational institutional foundation in the
E.U. played a key role in the generalization of mutual recognition under the
Europe 1992 program. Pursuant to the E.U.’s “global approach” to regulation,
products may be assessed and certified within any member state in order to receive a “CE” marking, which indicates that they comply with Communauté Européen norms. All member states must recognize these assessments and certifications (i.e. mandatory mutual recognition), so that products may circulate
freely throughout the E.U. market. In 1990, the member states formed the

60. Adapted from Nicolaidis and Egan, supra note 50.
61. Nicolaidis, supra note 4; Nicolaidis Thesis, supra note 54.
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European Organization for Testing and Certification (EOTC) to coordinate national bodies engaged in the assessment and certification processes and thereby
help assure national authorities of the reliability of tests conducted in other
member states.62 Each member state must approve and is responsible for overseeing the assessment bodies within its jurisdiction and must notify the Commission’s Enterprise Directorate-General of its approvals.63 Member state authorities periodically meet and exchange information about the process’s
operation through working groups and committees created pursuant to the respective E.U. directives. They thereby attempt to build and retain confidence
in the system.64 This E.U. system can be characterized as governance by coordinated cross-border public-private networks.65 The system is backed, however,
by potential enforcement through the actions of supranational bodies, in particular of the Commission and the European Court of Justice.
In light of the E.U.’s experience with applying the mutual recognition principle, the E.U.—not surprisingly—is a major advocate of its use internationally.
E.U. regulatory authorities have operated for over a decade under a dual mission of ensuring public safety, on the one hand, and ensuring free movement of
goods and services within the E.U.’s single market, on the other. They consequently are more experienced in managing the coordination of distinct national
regulatory systems than many of their non-E.U. counterparts.66 The E.U. experience thus offers a model to be considered and adapted for other transnational contexts.
Nonetheless, this model is hardly universal, and one observes a great deal of
variance in the patterns of mutual recognition. The slow progress in the transatlantic context is due, perhaps above all, to the low capacity of the United
States to deliver accountability mechanisms. The decentralized and privatized
character of U.S. regulation in some sectors, the jealously guarded autonomy of
federal agencies in other sectors, and the role of U.S. states in the regulation of

62. Michelle Egan, Mutual Recognition and Standard Setting: Public and Private Strategies for
Governing Markets, in Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 35, at 190. See also EGAN, supra note 58, at 152
(noting the purpose of the EOTC was to “(1) coordinate testing and certification practices to prevent
firms from having to undergo multiple market entry and approval requirements, and (2) develop a
common European framework to encourage mutual confidence and trust in member countries
regulatory and self-regulatory testing and certification practices”).
63. These testing and certification laboratories consequently are referred to as “notified bodies.”
The overall process is called the “global approach” because once a notified body certifies that a product
meets E.U. standards, the product may be marketed in all fifteen member states.
64. Firms and laboratories also remain subject to post-marketing member-state regulatory
controls, as well as market-reputational constraints.
65. See Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of
European agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y. 246 (1997); EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET,
supra note 58, at 12; see also R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing without Government, 44
POL. STUD. 652 (1996) (theoretical background on governance through networks).
66. Although the United States is a federalist system under which states may retain separate regulatory regimes unless preempted by federal legislation, the areas covered by the 1997 Mutual Recognition Agreement largely have been federalized, with federal regulatory agencies overseeing federal
regulations. The U.S. approach differs significantly from the multi-level, coordinative ones used in the
E.U.
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many services, have made U.S. negotiation of mutual recognition agreements
more difficult. And at the global level, mutual recognition is in its infancy, reflecting, in particular, the dearth of institutional foundations for creating and
maintaining trust among regulatory authorities.67 The WTO provides a potential framework for facilitating the multilateralization of mutual recognition arrangements, but this framework remains, and probably should remain, weak in
light of the primary need to build trust and confidence horizontally among state
regulatory systems and the resource-intensive character of “managed” recognition.
B. The Attributes of Managed Mutual Recognition
In the end, the key to the acceptability of mutual recognition to all the parties concerned, and thus of its “supply,” is its managed character.68 Patterns of
mutual recognition may vary enormously, but such variance can nevertheless be
analyzed around four main dimensions along which recognition can be managed or fine-tuned, namely:
(1) The establishment of prior conditions for the recognition of equivalence
between national systems will vary, as recognition will be a function of “compatibility thresholds” that will differ across issues, across partners, and over
time. Equivalence can also be assessed at different levels. For example, in the
case of professionals, regulations can examine the equivalence of the content of
the education itself, of the system of accreditation of training bodies, or of the
system for granting rights to practice;
(2) The degree of automaticity of access for the individual economic actors
may vary. It may be that national systems as a whole do not pass such an
equivalence test but that, given some broad equivalence at the macro-level,
beneficiaries of recognition such as professionals can be subjected to some residual equivalence test at the individual level. MRAs need to establish procedures to deal with variations and gaps between systems and must design means
to bridge these differences. For the professions, for instance, criteria can vary
as to eligibility for recognition in the first place or as to compensatory requirements;
(3) There is considerable variation in the scope of recognition. For example,
what is the range, mode, and object of practice to which banks or professionals
benefiting from recognition actually have access? Or what types of consumers
are sophisticated enough to be subject to mutual recognition? (This distinction
is relevant for instance in the case of insurance services.) Scope can be a highly
controversial issue simply because modalities of access to a given market can

67. See Nicolaidis & Egan, supra note 50.
68. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Globalization with Human Faces: Managed Mutual Recognition and the
Free Movement of Professionals, in THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION PROCESS (Fiorella, et al, eds., 2004); Kalypso Nicolaidis, Regulatory Cooperation and
Managed Mutual Recognition: Developing a Strategic Model, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION (George Bermann et al., eds, 2000).
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vary from one country to the next for nationals themselves. Even when this is
not the case, limiting scope during the initial phase of a mutual recognition
process can be seen as an opportunity to create a laboratory to test the impact
of liberalization;
(4) Finally, variation in ex post guarantees can serve to compensate for loss
of host country control by increasing the confidence that parties have in the mutual recognition process and therefore the legitimacy and sustainability of the
agreement.69 But control mechanisms are not costless, and their development is
therefore itself an object of negotiation.
Table 4 describes these four attributes across three issue areas: products, financial services and the professions.

69. This line of thinking can be presented under the general category of “securing insecure
contracts.” For a discussion, see Nicolaïdis, supra note 4.
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Table 4
70
The main attributes of “managed mutual recognition”

Examples:

Variation in:
Prior conditions:
Requirements
for equivalence between national systems

Products

Equivalence in
health, safety
and other technical standards
Equivalence of
standards of enforcement, including of testing and
certification
procedures
Mutual recognition of accreditation bodies
Ex-ante confidence building
measures
Test data & inspection report
vs final approval
Additional tests
and approval
procedures

a.

Usually full scope of
access except for consumer type (limitations on market access
stem from other market characteristics, e.g.
distribution channels,
fragmented domestic
jurisdiction)

a.

a.

b.

c.

d.

Automaticity:
Regulatory
scope of recognition and
residual entry
requirements
from entrant’s point
of view
Scope of access:
Limitations
on scope of
access to importing country market

Professional services

a.

b.

b.

c.

a.

b.

b.
c.
d.

e.

Financial services

Equivalence of
professional
standards
Equivalence of
accreditation and
licensing procedures
Inter-recognition
between competent bodies

a.

Eligibility: recognition of professional training
and competence
Compensatory
requirements

a.

Right to practice
vs title
Scope of permissible activity
Rules of conduct
and enforcement
Cross-border
supply vs establishment
Temporary vs
permanent right
of access

a.

b.

b.
c.

b.

c.

d.

e.
Ex-post guarantees:
Alternatives to
host country
control (applies to all
three)

a.
b.
c.
d.

Mutual monitoring
Collaboration and accountability
Competition law and dispute resolution
mechanisms
Case-by-case safeguards and overall reversibility

70. Nicolaidis, in BERMAN (2000).

Equivalence
of prudential
standards
Equivalence
of authorization and licensing procedures

Notification
by home state
Proof of licensing
Additional
spot checks

Initial entry vs
ongoing supervision
Scope of permissible activities / products
Rules of conduct and enforcement
Cross-border
supply vs establishment
Consumer
type
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The point is that managed mutual recognition can be viewed in a static or in
a dynamic manner. At a given point in time, variations along each of these dimensions indicate how far parties have traveled down the road to full recognition. Dynamically, mutual recognition can be viewed as a process, involving
implicit or explicit trade-offs between these dimensions to accommodate the
“supply side” (for example, regulators’ requirements) that may change over
time. The more parties are aware of these potential trade-offs, the higher the
likelihood that they will reach agreement and devise solutions acceptable to all.
In some cases, it may be more appropriate to relax prior conditions of equivalence and concentrate on the fine-tuning of automaticity (E.U.). In others, reducing initial scope may be considered as a way to test the grounds (NAFTA).
From a dynamic viewpoint, scope and automaticity can be reduced initially to
accommodate insufficient prior equivalence and expanded later in light of ex
post cooperation.71 In general, however, all of these dimensions are ultimately a
function of the degree of confidence between systems.
C. The Foundations of Confidence: Trust, Monitoring, Capacity Building, and
Other-Regarding Regulatory Cultures
The negotiation and implementation of MRAs raise fundamental questions
of the compatibility of substantive laws and institutional cultures. But from
where do such judgements of “compatibility” come? The answer is not straightforward. Parties must know something about each other’s standards and practices, but they operate in a game of incomplete information. Mutual recognition provides for implementation of a new international division of labor
between regulators and regulatory systems in order to reduce the costs associated with regulators’ having to extract information about the quality of foreign
products independently. Thus, while home regulators must be seen to do their
job, they also must be trusted for what is not seen. In fact, the balance between
“blind trust” and monitoring to compensate for the lack of such trust constantly
shifts when parties apply mutual recognition arrangements. To be successful,
parties engaged in mutual recognition arrangements must build trust through
transparency, sustained exchange, monitoring, and (in the case of developing
countries) capacity building. These mechanisms, in turn, make it less necessary
to simply trust other parties in their regulatory roles.
Trust, about which much has been written across fields,72 is usually understood to be interpersonal and subjective in nature insofar as it relates to specific

71. For a detailed discussion see id.; see also Nicolaidis, supra note 68.
72. See, e.g., H. GARFINKEL, A Conception of, and Experiments with “Trust” as a Condition of Stable, Concerted Actions, in MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION, COGNITIVE DETERMINANTS (O.
J. Harvey. Ed. 1963) (in psychology); S. HERBERT FRANKEL, MONEY: TWO PHILOSOPHIES: THE
CONFLICT OF TRUST AND AUTHORITY (1977) (in social psychology); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST:
THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995) (in political science); ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (in
political science); TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (Diego Gambetta, ed.,
1988) (also in political science).
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exchanges between specific actors in specific contexts. Since mutual recognition
describes a relationship between regulatory systems underpinned by a relationship between public and private actors, what ultimately matters is institutional
confidence—that is, a more objective phenomenon combining networks of interpersonal trust with ongoing updating and deepening of mutual knowledge
between the systems. In other words, confidence can be viewed as the necessary
objective character of the structure within which the recognition relationship
occurs, while trust can be viewed as the defining subjective character of the relations between agents operating within the structure.73 Confidence, therefore, is
predicated on a greater degree of knowledge of what is (and is likely to be) than
trust, which involves a greater degree of risk. In effect, the managed character
of mutual recognition can be seen as a mechanism to transform a situation relying (imperfectly) on trust, to one relying (more steadfastly) on confidence.
Regulatory change is a key variable in this process. While mutual recognition is negotiated at a given moment in time, home regulations and enforcement
practices are bound to change as a function of participating actors, prevailing
beliefs, and technological developments. Home and host states can, to start, notify regulatory changes to each other to ensure greater transparency. This process has been institutionalized through the WTO, SPS, and TBT agreements,
which require WTO members to notify regulatory changes to the respective
WTO oversight committees.74 However, although information is a prerequisite
and can serve, at least in part, as an alternative to trust, information alone is
likely insufficient. Trust also needs to be institutionalized through sustained
practice. Regulators engaged in this process must gain and sustain trust and
confidence in each other’s decisions, in particular, in areas affecting public
health and safety in which they are asked to rely on testing, certifications, and
accreditations by foreign laboratories and officials. They will trust each other
only if they are assured their regulatory counterparts hold the necessary capacity to advance the social goals of a coordinated regulatory program. As Majone
writes regarding the E.U.’s internal regulatory networks, “for a co-ordinated

73. See Shachar Nativ, E-money in the age of globalization, (Unpublished D.Phil thesis, Oxford
University).
74. WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 27 (1994), at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sp5.pdf, art. 7 (requiring members to notify changes in
and provide information on their sanitary and phytosanitary measures); TBT, supra note 18, art. 2.5
(requiring a member—upon request from another member—to justify a technical regulation that has a
“significant effect” on trade of other members), art. 2.9 (requiring members that propose new technical
regulations that do not comply with international standards and that significantly effect trade to
publish, notify other members, provide copies of the new regulations, and allow other members
reasonable time to comment), art. 2.11 (requiring members to promptly publish or otherwise make
available all new technical regulations), art. 5.28 (providing a procedure to review complaints and take
corrective action concerning the operation of technical regulations conformity assessment procedures),
art. 5.6 (similar to article 2.9 but applying to conformity assessment procedures), and art. 10 (requiring
inquiry points to answer reasonable inquiries regarding technical regulations, standards, and conformity
assessment procedures); see also Article X of GATT (“Publication and Administration of Trade
Regulations”).
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partnership . . . to operate effectively, . . . each participating organization must
be able to perform the tasks assigned it, and there must be sufficient trust
among the partners to keep the costs of transacting within acceptable limits.”75
In the framework developed here, mutual recognition regimes rely on convergent mutual expectations predicated on systemic confidence and intersubjective trust. Mutual recognition arrangements provide for the legalization
and institutionalization of regulatory exchange pursuant to which greater confidence may be built and sustained.
Information and regulatory exchange are not free. To the extent that regulators are already overburdened, they may not take the time, ex ante, to engage
with their foreign counterparts or, ex post, to review information, especially
when it may be provided in either a foreign language or by an official not fully
fluent in a common language, such as English. Regulators must also hold the
resources necessary to make managed mutual recognition work over time. In
the end, however, in an age of limited government resources for the oversight of
rapidly changing, expanding, and interacting economies, regulators can also
save costs through enhanced cooperation with foreign regulatory officials and
decentralized product certification systems. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, simply does not have the resources to adequately
conduct all testing itself, especially when testing involves significant foreign
travel.76 By permitting its “over-extended and under-resourced” staff77 to outsource testing and evaluating medical devices to private bodies, the FDA can
reallocate its resources to areas of higher concern while retaining high product
and process standards and post-market surveillance controls.
When MRAs include developing countries, significant capacity building and
technical assistance may be prerequisites for recognition of their standards and
conformity-assessment decisions. The E.U. has engaged in assisting developing
countries to upgrade their home standards in order for them to be recognized so
their products and services may be marketed in the EU. For example, the E.U.
provided refrigerators and free consulting to African countries in the great
lakes region so the fish they wish to export to the E.U. can be accepted.78 Simi-

75. MAJONE, supra note 54, at 276. Majone further notes how “the principle of mutual recognition
is extremely demanding in terms of mutual trust”). Id. at 279.
76. FDA officials also note that by freeing the FDA from having to conduct tests in Europe, FDA
can allocate more resources to products produced elsewhere, such as “surgical gloves produced in
Malaysia.” Telephone Interview with FDA Official (June 8, 2001).
77. Richard A. Merrill, The Importance and Challenges of “Mutual Recognition,” 29 SETON HALL
L. REV. 736, 745 (1998) (further noting “that resources have not kept pace with workload”). “Since the
early 1960s, however, FDA has found it necessary to develop new cooperative arrangements with foreign governments to facilitate its surveillance of imported regulated products. The need for these
agreements has grown in direct proportion to the volume of imports under the agency’s purview, which
have increased from 500,000 shipments in 1970 to 3,700,000 shipments in 1996.” Sharon Smith Holston,
An Overview of International Cooperation, 52 FOOD &DRUG L.J. 197, 198 (1997). Ms. Holston was
FDA Deputy Commissioner for External Affairs.
78. “The EU is currently funding several projects aimed at improving the post-harvest handling of
fish catches, particularly for artisanal fishermen in several African countries. Many of these projects
are motivated by Art. 34(3) of the Cotonou Agreement in which the EU agreed that economic and
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larly, the United States has provided technical assistance to help countries catch
wild shrimp in a manner that does not threaten endangered sea turtles.79 Article
11 of the TBT Agreement calls on its members to provide technical assistance
to developing countries in preparating technical regulations and in establishing
national standardizing- and conformity-assessment bodies.80 However, although
trade-related capacity-building endeavours abound, they are often not wellcoordinated, hampering the development of north-south mutual recognition arrangements.81
Finally, mutual recognition regimes are most likely to be successful if states
implement “other-regarding” regulatory approaches, thereby helping to build
trust over time. In many cases, there may be functional substitutes for otherregarding processes because domestic importers and consumer groups serve as
proxies for outsider interests. Protectionist behaviour (including the refusal to
extend recognition for arbitrary reasons) hurts domestic actors who, in internalizing the injury to the outside third party, become a domestic proxy. However,
this proxy may be ineffective because of political malfunctions. For example,
protectionist groups may have higher per capita stakes in the outcome, spurring
them to organize politically to block the competing import, and consumer
groups may face significant collective action problems.
Home and host countries can adapt mechanisms to take into account the effect of their regulations on the other’s constituents. The transatlantic business
and civil society dialogues represent one approach insofar as they are able to
trade cooperation shall aim at enhancing the production, supply and trading capacity of the ACP [Africa, Caribbean, Pacific] countries. There is currently an on-going five-year 45 million Euro project,
funded by the European Development Fund (EDF, created pursuant to Art. 131 and 136 of the 1957
Treaty of Rome). The project, which started in 2002, is operated jointly by the European Commission
and the ACP Secretariat and targets 17 African ACP countries, including those around the great lakes
region. The project makes provision for technical assistance in fisheries management, direct infrastructural lending for improved landing and storage facilities and equipment (including a credit line for artisanal fishermen), enhanced testing laboratories and processing factories among others.” E-mail to
Shaffer from a Food and Agriculture Organization Representative (Jan. 16, 2005).
79. See Status Report by the United States, Addendum, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/15/Add.4, at 2 (Jan 17, 2000) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). These status reports
of progress on implementation of recommendations are required pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU.
80. See, e.g., TBT, Article 12.7: “Members shall . . . provide technical assistance to developing
country Members to ensure that the preparation and application of technical regulations, standards and
conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to the expansion and diversification of exports from developing country Members.” TBT, supra note 18, at clvii.
81. Because donors like to take “credit” for assistance projects, they prefer not to provide substantial funding through an international organization or a common fund. As Susan Prowse of the U.K.’s
Department for International Development writes, different agencies thus often support “a vertical
multiplicity of trade-related assistance initiatives with little to no horizontal coordination.” Susan
Prowse, The Role of International and National Agencies in Trade-Related Capacity Building, 25 THE
WORLD ECON. 1235, 1239 (2002), (citing TOM PENGELLY & MARK GEORGE, BUILDING TRADE
POLICY CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO PLANNING TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAMMES (UK DFID, 2001) (on file with Law
& Contemp. Probs.), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/buildingtradecapacity.pdf)(last visited Apr. 12, 2005); see also Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
Serve Developing Countries?, in REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY,
EFFICIENCY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed.) (forthcoming 2005).
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coordinate input to their respective regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.82
Transnational institutions can also spur other-regarding national processes. A
number of WTO judicial decisions have attempted to facilitate such exchange.
In the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case, for example, the Appellate Body effectively required the United States to create an administrative procedure pursuant to
which foreign governments or traders would have an opportunity to comment
on U.S. regulatory decisions that affect them.83 The Appellate Body held that
the initial application of the U.S. trade measures were “arbitrary” in that the
certification process was not “transparent” or “predictable,” and did not provide any “formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard or to respond
to any arguments that may be made against it.”84 It admonished the United
States for failing to take “into consideration the different conditions which may
occur in the territories of . . . other Members.85” It required the United States to
assure that its policies were appropriate for the local conditions prevailing in
developing countries. The WTO Appellate Body, within the institutional constraints it faced, attempted to foster domestic institutional processes that permit
for greater participation of affected foreign parties.86
In a five-year-long exercise dedicated to the support of regulatory reform
across the world, the OECD secretariat developed a set of criteria to assess the
effectiveness of such reforms. One, for example, concerned trade-compatibility,
although the OECD noted the way in which compatibility could be fostered depended on domestic contexts. Mutual-recognition-friendly regulatory reform
meant, in particular, that domestic regulatory processes were to be more open
to the influence of third parties, that non-nationals were not to be barred from
applying for certification, and that laboratories and other bodies from other
countries were to be given accreditation authority to the extent possible.87
In the end, regulators are more likely to engage in effective mutual recognition regimes if they know they will be implemented in a transparent manner,
are subject to monitoring and other ex post contols, and, ultimately, allow for
reversibility based on new information. Reversibility is, of course, the “nuclear
option” in recognition deals. If all the safeguards put in place to ensure continued confidence between parties simply fail, then each party has the option to
renege on its commitments. In fact, MRAs generally contain such a reversibility clause.
Nevertheless, in light of technological and other market developments, reversibility may sometimes be difficult to implement in practice. How can the
82. See Cowles, supra note 41; Bignami & Charnovitz, supra note 49, both in Pollack & Shaffer,
supra note 35.
83. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products; Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (on file with Law &
Contemp. Probs.), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
84. Id., para 180.
85. Id., para 164.
86. This point is developed in Shaffer, supra note 16.
87. Nicolaidis, supra note 4.
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UK, for instance, practically forbid its citizens to access worldwide television
channels through satellite links? Such controls would require unprecedented
and costly policing. Increasingly, technologies and commercial links allow actors to escape the kind of state control that would simply allow regulatory authorities to activate the on-off switch, whether they enter into mutual recognition arrangements or not. An advantage of mutual recognition arrangements,
once more, is that they foster regulatory coordination and confidence-building
in an economically integrating world in which the alternative is often de facto
unilateral recognition of foreign standards and procedures as a result of otherwise autonomous technological and market forces.
V
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: FROM MECHANISMS OF
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE HARD DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA
In order to understand the main features of any emerging global administrative law, its normative underpinnings must be considered. Ultimately, any system for transnational governance will only be sustainable if it is legitimate.
Economic actors, be they producers, consumers, suppliers, state agents, or private actors granted public authority (and, even more broadly, citizens), must
understand enough about the new global dynamics to be able to play their parts
effectively in it, however small or complementary those parts may be.
The framing paper for the global administrative law project presents a three
layered normative framework, typologized in terms of intra-regime accountability,88 rights-based mechanisms, and democracy-enhancing measures. Of the
three, the proponents appear to be most comfortable with the accountability
frame89 This choice seems reasonable, although all the frames can be collapsed
into the broader concept of accountability while still highlighting the democracy
dilemma.90
88. However, by “intra” they refer to “global,” so the accountability frame appears to cover everything within the field.
89. This from Keohane’s recent work, with the other two frames being complementary to it. See
Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Redefining Accountability for Global Governance, in GOVERNANCE IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, eds., 2003); Robert Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION, FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE
(David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibuigi, eds., 2003).
90. Kingsbury et. al. use the English school distinction between patterns of pluralism, solidarism,
and cosmopolitanism, and juxtapose the above three normative conceptions of the role of global
administrative law in terms of these typologies. Pluralism implies that value conflicts are not resolved
within the system and that the power of implementation is retained by states. In this frame, global
administrative law serves to enforce internal administrative accountability (“securing their
accountability to the legitimating center”). Solidarism describes a system of deepened cooperation
among states based on shared values pursuant to which rights are defined and enforced at the global
level. In this frame, global administrative law serves to protect private rights through participation and
judicial review, irrespective of nationality. Finally, cosmopolitanism draws from network theory and
theories regarding global (borderless) markets. In this frame, global administrative law ought to be
premised on the promotion of democracy beyond the state. On this basis, the authors differentiate
three normative conceptions against which global administrative law is to be measured—those of
accountability (associated with pluralism), of rights protection (associated with solidarism), and
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The concept of accountability refers to the ability of affected parties to hold
decisionmakers accountable, ultimately through sanctioning them.91 As regards
democratic accountability, decisionmakers must respond to citizen demands or
they will be voted out of office. Under rights-based mechanisms, constituents
are granted legal rights that they may pursue before courts or other processes.
If their rights have been infringed, the decisions affecting them are to be reversed or modified and (potentially) they are to receive compensation. Thus,
the “rights” and “democracy” frames can be viewed as tools to ensure the accountability of decisionmakers to affected parties.
A. Horizontal Accountability Mechanisms
Mutual recognition regimes call for the same categories of accountability as
those identified in the framing paper by Kingsbury et al. for global administrative law generally, but with an important twist. In this case, networks of horizontal division of labor raise questions of horizontal accountability between political, judicial, and regulatory authorities in one country towards not only
regulators, but also the publics in another. Supra-national actors play a role,
but mainly that of facilitator, broker, mediator, or adjudicator of these horizontal relationships. The best theoretical analogy to the mutual recognition approach is Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan law—that is, the law that defines
the obligations of a state regarding citizens of other states. In the mutual recognition context, the host state is obliged not to discriminate against or unfairly
treat those coming within its borders from outside, while the home state must
consider the “consumption” of its rules by consumers and citizens outside its
borders. In sum, from the angle of mutual recognition regimes, the key is to
transfer the concepts presented in most analyses of global governance that address the degree of autonomy of the international sphere from the state (focusing on the vertical dimension of global governance), to a context in which the
transfer of sovereignty is horizontal.
A central issue in assessing accountability, particularly when speaking of
horizontal governance in the form of mutual recognition regimes, is the issue of
accountability to whom. That is, to whom are domestic regulators accountable
in an economically integrated world in which one jurisdiction’s decisions can
have significant impact on outsiders, whether because the national system may
regulate too little, too much, or may simply take account of the interests of its
own constituents before those of affected outsiders? One can speak of internal
and external accountability, with internal accountability referring to that of national decisionmakers toward those within the polity, and external accountabil-

democracy (associated with cosmopolitanism). It seems conceptually strained and inaccurate to focus
on these three different goals solely in relation to these distinct governance models. Thus the focus on
the normative mechanisms separately from the English school typologies.
91. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 89.
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ity referring to accountability toward those outside it.92 External accountability
gaps tend to pose even greater challenges than internal ones.
In national democracies, internal accountability mechanisms include a key
democratic legitimizing component. Although domestic administrative officials
are not directly elected, they are held accountable to citizens through elected
legislative representatives who delegate authority to them through legislation
and who determine budgetary allotments provided to these officials for the fulfilment of their missions. If citizens are unsatisfied, they can elect a new government to pass new legislation or exercise other controls over administrative
agencies.
In a world of increasing numbers and complexity, nonetheless, it is impossible for representative institutions to address all matters having a social impact
at the national level as well. Domestic decisionmaking is thus frequently delegated—whether formally or informally—to non-representative institutions, such
as bureaucracies, courts, quasi-public bodies, private companies, public-private
networks, and market processes. It is useful to differentiate the concept of governance from that of government to assess decisionmaking mechanisms that are
not directly accountable to a popularly elected body. Governance relies on
other accountability mechanisms.
That transnational institutions and regimes are not subject to control
through direct popular elections or referenda subjects them to frequent charges
that they are “illegitimate” because they are not “democratic.” Although there
are serious normative concerns about the accountability of global institutions,
critics can also manipulate arguments over “legitimacy” to advance particular
substantive policy preferences, as opposed to democratic ones. Nothing inherent in global and transnational governance mechanisms makes them more or
less representative of affected parties’ competing views and interests than domestic processes. Decisionmaking processes of different national orders affect
each other’s constituents. On the one hand, government representatives cannot
control the impact of decisions made abroad on their constituents. On the
other, national representatives make decisions that affect foreign constituents
without those constituents being represented. From an accountability perspective, each domestic order is thus imperfect. Transnational governance mechanisms aim to address the conflicts and the need for cooperation between these
interacting national orders.
In addition, transborder economic processes take place regardless of
whether any formal transnational governance mechanisms exist. Technological
developments, such as the internet, e-mail, satellite media, or future communication and transport modes yet to be conceived strengthen these transnational
market developments. Global and transnational governance mechanisms are
needed precisely to address these ever-new governance challenges, which occur
irrespective of the wills of citizens around the world.

92. Id. at 141.
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Nonetheless, tensions between internal and external accountability mechanisms take us back to the central issue of “accountability to whom?” Regulators, in response to domestic constituencies, may refuse to take account of the
impact of their decisions on outsiders. Indeed, the U.S. system can be characterized as one involving relatively high levels of internal accountability, but low
levels of external accountability,93 a point touched on earlier respecting U.S.
forms of unilateral (as opposed to cooperative) extraterritoriality. Yet the
United States also has strong incentives to engage in mutual recognition arrangements, both to advance the interests of its commercial constituencies and
to protect its consumers in a world where technology increasingly facilitates
cross-border exchange and, in consequence, transnational impacts. The United
States, like any other state, thus has incentives to ensure that foreign regulatory
systems are accountable when their decisions affect U.S. constituents, and, in
return, has incentives to agree to make its own regulatory system more accountable to outsiders. The same applies for the E.U. with the important caveat
that its regulatory culture is much more attuned to such external impact assessments.
Accountability mechanisms other than democratic ones reflect those already
used in systems of national administrative law for domestic citizens. Transnational accountability mechanisms start with various ways of enhancing the procedural participation of non-citizens. National administrators are to operate
transparently.94 In the mutual recognition context, domestic regulators must give
notice of proposed standards, make explicit the extent to which home or host
state rules will apply, and give notice of changes to standards that have already
been considered equivalent. Foreign states and individuals are to have a right
to be heard by national administrators, whether directly or indirectly. In sum,
national authorities must “take account,” even if only through transparent procedures, of consumers and citizens outside their national territories if they are
to be more accountable to those on whom their decisions have an effect.
But extending the concept of national regulatory accountability to constituents outside of a polity raises not only larger democratic concerns (addressed
below), but also pragmatic ones. Pragmatically, what does this extension imply
in terms of formal and informal obligations to non-state constituents? To what
extent are regulators required to inform foreign actors as thoroughly as domestic ones? Just to start, standards cannot be issued in all languages. Who is to
fund these accountability mechanisms, especially if they are to apply to poorer

93. See id.
94. The accountability mechanism of transparency is intricately related to the concepts of trust and
confidence examined earlier. As Amartya Sen writes, “Transparency guarantees deal with the need for
openness that people expect: the freedom to deal with another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trust is seriously violated, the lives of many people—both direct parties and third
parties—may be adversely affected by the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the
right to disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom. These guarantees have
a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings.”
Amartya Sen, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 40 (1999).
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countries? Most mutual recognition regimes require the setting up of “notification and inquiry points” to centralize external information requirements, but
these mechanisms require funding of public (or quasi-public) entities. There is
no fixed answer to these questions. Rather, they are subject to negotiation and
deliberation as part of the dynamic process institutionalized in a mutual recognition arrangement.
Mutual recognition regimes can also require that all actors involved in the
process provide reasoned decisions. In particular, parties can be required to justify why they refuse to grant recognition, or refuse to continue to grant recognition, to countries or importers that had benefited from de facto recognition until then (for example, the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case discussed above).95 Reasoned
justification must be given on several grounds, including in response to the following questions: What is the scope of the recognition accorded? Why are
some parties beneficiaries and others not? What are the conditions attached to
such recognition? The requirement of reasoned explanation is essential because parties must explain to their own and to foreign producers and consumers
not only how the system will operate, but why the legal system governing their
interaction will diverge from the traditional territorial paradigm. Broadly
speaking, the decision as to whether some observed regulatory or legal differences are legitimate or may be deemed equivalently protective of the public
cannot be confined to the technical domain of expert decisions.
Next, accountability mechanisms include the review of these decisions by judicial processes at the national or transnational levels. This component of accountability mechanisms typically entails the protection of rights, whether those
rights are granted to private actors or to states. While global governance regimes, such as the WTO, remain formally intergovernmental in nature so that
only member states have the right to bring legal claims before WTO panels,
these states respond to demands from private actors, often working closely with
them through the formation of public–private networks.96 As a result, under
mutual recognition regimes, private actors can have both direct rights before
foreign courts and administrative bodies and indirect rights before supranational ones.
In mutual recognition cases, the entitlement to judicial review involves, first
of all, a jurisdictional decision over the applicable law and the conditions of its
application. The MRA itself can specify the applicable law and the court or
administrative body that would hear a claim. In practice, international or supranational judicial bodies often determine the conditions pursuant to which a
host state can apply host state law or must effectively defer to home state determinations. Supranational judiciaries have played this role within the E.U.
system, as in the Cassis de Dijon decision and the case law that followed, includ95. See supra notes 16, 79, and 83.
96. See GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN
WTO LITIGATION (2003). Technically, in the WTO context, WTO members include a few non-state
“customs territories,” such as Hong Kong and the European Community.
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ing Keck,97 and within the global system, as in the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle, EC–
Asbestos, and SPS and TBT decisions of the WTO Appellate Body.98 Alternatively, national courts can develop convergent national norms by engaging with
and citing each other’s judicial opinions.99 They can also develop their own
(non-national) cosmopolitan common law norms.100 Finally, as noted earlier,
they can allocate jurisdictional authority themselves by applying the principle of
comity.101
In this context, just as under domestic administrative law, mutual recognition regimes can set standards for judicial review of national decisions, examining whether recognition (or its refusal) is legitimate in a given case. The choice
of review standards includes those of proportionality, means-ends rationality,
least restrictive means, and cost-benefit balancing. From a normative perspective, the question arises whether the state’s action, or the standard of review
applied by the transnational arrangement, is disproportionate. That is, is it appropriate to demand that host state legislators forgo their right under traditional territorial principles to regulate a transaction occurring within their borders, and if so, within what context (the substantive and geographical scope)
and within what limits (the conditions)? The less stringent the proportionality
required of state decisionmaking, the more deference (or subsidiarity) provided
to national and local political processes. Conversely, the more stringent the
standard of proportionality, the more constrained the state’s choices over the
means to achieve its social goals, and thus the more intrusive on state sovereignty. Hence, for instance, requiring the adoption of a least trade restrictive
means (such as recognition along with a labelling obligation) imposes one policy
approach over others (such as non-discriminatory regulations that ban products
failing to meet the standard), ones that might have been preferred by a majority
in the state in question. In short, the effects of applying a single principle, such
as that of proportionality, vary as a function of the relative importance one
gives to internal versus external accountability goals. Once more, the central
issue of accountability to whom arises.
Principles and norms typically call for a definition of the context in which
they apply, and therefore (implicitly) exceptions in which they might not—
hence, the “managed” character of mutual recognition regarding, in particular,
its scope and reversibility. Substantively, MRAs are often sectoral in nature,
and not cross-cutting. Individually, these MRAs will vary in scope of applica97. Case C-267/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R.
I-6097, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101 (1993).
98. See supra notes 16, 12 and 13 (U.S Shrimp–Turtle, EC–Meat Hormones, and EC–Sardines decisions, respectively); see also Report of Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (on file with Law &
Contemp. Probs.), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ (the EC-asbestos decision) (last visited Apr.
12, 2005).
99. See Slaughter, supra note 37; Bermann, supra note 37.
100. See Graeme B. Dimwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000).
101. See supra note 34.
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tion as a function of the sensibility of a sector or sub-part of a sector. For example, mutual recognition of standards and conformity assessment procedures
for surgical instruments is more sensitive than that for band-aids. Thus, the
1997 U.S.–E.U. MRA for medical devices only applied to less stringently regulated medical devices, subject to possible expansion based on a “pilot program.”102
In addition, parties include exceptions in which recognition could threaten
national security, financial stability, or social peace (“ordre public”).103 Thus, for
instance, the “Bolkenstein directive” (which provides for the application of
home state law in the services trade) does not apply to the labor conditions under which workers employed by home state entities provide services for a particular project through their physical presence in the host state. In this case, the
law and collective bargaining conventions applicable in the host state are to apply—although the exceptions to this exception contained in the directive have
themselves raised political havoc. The question raised is whether, or to what
extent, social peace is threatened by the application of different labor law arrangements in the same physical space. Here, the question that should be asked
is whether negative externalities within the host state are potentially so destructive as to justify complete deference to host state standards.
The same issue of externalities applies to mutual recognition in the field of
finance, when the import of financially unsound products may put at risk the
host country’s financial system as a whole. In this case, the granting of a “passport” is invariably conditioned upon standardization exercises to address concerns over financial stability, such as the BIS capital adequacy standards.104 The
WTO itself provides for exceptions to trading requirements when financial stability is threatened, as pursuant to articles XII and XVIII of the GATT.105
Even more controversially, national security concerns have become pervasive in a post-September 11 world, infiltrating regulatory domains where they

102. Appendix 2 of the medical device annex specifies that the agreement only covers class 1
products (such as bandages) and certain listed class 2 products. The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) can expand this list following its review of a “pilot program,” although in no
case does the agreement cover “any U.S. Class II-tier 3 or any Class 3 product.” FDA categorizes
medical devices under three classes, while the E.U. divides them into four. See John Chai, Medical
Device Regulation in the United States and the European Union: A Comparative Study, 55 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 57 (2000) (providing an overview of these classification systems).
103. Mutual recognition agreements may simply use a catch-all phrase to capture these concerns,
such as an exception for protecting the “public interest” or the “national interest.”
104. See, e.g., David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5
CHICAGO J. OF INT’L L. 547 (2005) (discussing the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and its
role in financial standard-setting).
105. Article XII, Paragraph 1 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI, any
contracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial position and balance of payments, may
restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported, subject to the provisions of the
following paragraphs of this Article.”); Article XVIII, Paragraph 1 (“The contracting parties recognize
that special governmental assistance may be required to promote the establishment, development or
reconstruction of particular industries or particular branches of agriculture, and that in appropriate circumstances the grant of such assistance in the form of protective measures is justified.”) GATT, supra
note 18.
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were once less at issue in light of the risk of terrorist attacks on food chains,
transport, communication, and energy infrastructures, or in ways yet to be conceived. As Keohane writes, “Attempts to increase accountability in world politics must take account of the airplane assassins of 9/11, their confederates, and
their supporters. Political theory will not be credible if it demands that good
people enter into what is in effect a suicide pact.”106
Indeed, it is not hard to explain the denial of pre-existing mutual recognition
arrangements in the field of transport. Before the September 11 tragedy, countries largely engaged in de facto mutual recognition of their regulations for the
packing of shipping containers. In the post-September 11 world, however, the
United States no longer recognizes the adequacy of foreign authorities to pack
shipping containers. Under the United States’ new “Container Security Initiative” (CSI), the United States presses key port countries to sign bilateral treaties that allow U.S. customs agents to be present at foreign ports in order to
monitor the prescreening of containers bound for the United States.107 U.S. and
foreign customs agents are to work together to “ensure identification, screening, and the sealing off of high-risk containers at the earliest possible opportunity.”108 A CSI agreement between the U.S. and Canada has already been implemented.109 This approach stands in stark contrast to the pre-September 11
practice of inspecting containers once they reached U.S. shores, of which only
around two per cent were subject to rigorous inspection.110
Similarly, in the pre-September 11 world, airline passengers largely travelled
under the blessing of their state of departure, which was most frequently their
home state. Countries largely delegated to each other the role of gathering
data, if any, on passengers boarding international flights. In the postSeptember 11 world, once again, the United States no longer recognizes the
adequacy of foreign authorities’ collection of data on aircraft passengers to the
United States. Rather, pursuant to the U.S. Aviation and Security Act of 2001,
U.S. customs officials now collect defined types of information about air passengers before they board a plane to the United States. These new U.S. policies
raised consternation in Europe, leading to the negotiation of a transatlantic
agreement on passenger data and the European Parliament’s challenge of this

106. Keohane, supra note 89, at 133.
107. See Jessica Romero, Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security Initiative, 4 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 597 (2003). In response to deals reached between the United States and the Netherlands,
France, Germany, and Belgium, the European Commission filed a complaint before the European
Court of Justice arguing that the “deals effectively give cargo passing through participating ports
preferential treatment, and that shippers will start to divert America-bound cargo to those ports from
others in the European Union. Under its rules, the union argues, individual members are not allowed
to make such deals; the same trade preferences must apply to all 15 members and not be negotiated
individually.” Gregory Crouch, Europe Acts Against U.S. Effort on Ports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at
W1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Edward Alden, US in Efforts to Make Cargo Shipping Safer: Terrorism Fears Have Prompted
An Overhaul of International Container Trade Security, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at 12.
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agreement before the European Court of Justice under internal E.U. data privacy law.111
National security concerns demonstrate the geographically bounded nature
of MRAs. In the post-September 11 world, one can see more clearly how mutual recognition agreements (and global and transnational governance mechanisms generally) are applied differentially between geographic zones. If such
regimes were on their radar screen, U.S. neoconservatives would tend to concentrate on areas where global governance does not work.112 There is little
doubt they would therefore discount the utility of mutual recognition. Global
governance advocates, on the other hand, would tend to concentrate on where
it already constitutes daily practice. Yet these opposing analysts may agree that
transnational governance mechanisms are not universal or universally applied,
and thus do not constitute a single space. In other words, one could draw two
maps of the world from the neoconservative and global governance perspectives. Neoconservatives tend to see the world as predominantly Hobbesian,
dotted by Kantian islands of transnational governance. Global governance advocates tend to see the world as predominantly (or at least potentially predominantly) Kantian, interrupted by Hobbesian islands of conflict. In both cases,
most commentators recognize that the world of transnational governance (and
with it, of mutual recognition) is bounded and contains defined spaces (and, in
some cases, potentially large spaces) of exceptions that will vary in time.
The concept of exceptions to mutual recognition (and global governance
and global administrative law more generally) again highlights the issue of the
boundaries between the application of transnational mechanisms and their exceptions. That is, when should mutual recognition apply and when should it
not? Related to this question is another: To whom should domestic regulators
be accountable and to what extent? These linked questions both raise the fundamental issue of boundaries in transnational governance in which regulators,
who traditionally were accountable to their constituents alone pursuant to territorial principles of sovereignty, now engage in arrangements pursuant to which
they are to be accountable to non-constituents. What should these boundaries
be?

111. The U.S.-E.U. agreement was signed and went into force on May 28, 2004. Under the
agreement with the E.U., U.S. customs officials can hold this data for three and a half years and share it
with other U.S. government agencies. See John Tagliabue, Europe and the U.S. at Odds on Airlines and
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, § 5, at 3; Paul Mueller, Europe Asks Court to Rule on Air Security
Pact, N. Y. TIMES, April 22, 2004, at W1; “E.U.–U.S. agreement on transfer of air passenger data
officially signed” (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), at http://europa.eu.int/idabc/
en/document/2596/601 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005); “European Parliament asks Court of Justice to annul
E.U.–U.S. passenger data deal” (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems), at
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3130/601 (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
112. See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER (2003).
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B. The Democracy Dilemma
Beyond various levels of, and mechanisms for, accountability, the global
administrative law project rightly raises the broader normative challenge of
democracy. In this case, the question of democracy arises because mutual recognition arrangements highlight the tensions between the accountability of
regulators to a territorially defined citizenry, on the one hand, and their accountability to foreign regulators and constituents pursuant to agreements that
can involve the application of non-territorially defined and enforced laws, on
the other. Under mutual recognition regimes (and global administrative law
generally), regulators are asked to be accountable to those outside the polity itself, including wherever interests may clash. Again the question arises: to
whom should national regulators be accountable?
From the perspective of democratic accountability, at least four choices are
reflected in the framing paper—that of deference to national polities, as reflected in the national treatment principle, resulting in a pluralist order; that of
centralized “solidarist” government, as reflected in global harmonization of
standards and in setting up global enforcement agencies; that of the horizontal
enlargement of the polity through complete deference to the market along an
ordo-liberal, cosmopolitan, “free trade” model enforced through global institutions;113 and that of the horizontal extension of the polity through cooperative,
decentralized law-making made accountable to a public beyond the polity, as
reflected in the discussed version of managed mutual recognition.114
In the mutual recognition context, democracy will work primarily at the national level through creating constraints on national administrators. Each state
regulatory authority first is subject to its own democratic checks. The procedural requirements of transparency, reasoned decisions, and judicial review operate not only to make national decisionmaking more accountable to outsiders.
They also serve to reassure domestic citizens that the regime protects them
from processes that inevitably occur outside their borders in an economically
integrated world order. They thus help to ensure that national regulators are
held internally accountable to their own publics through traditional democratic
processes.115 By requiring its members to be democracies, the Treaty Establish-

113. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
114. The framing paper sets forth the three typologies of pluralism, solidarism, and cosmopolitanism. See supra note 90. It does not expressly address an ordo-liberal model of free trade, although this
could be viewed as a variant of the cosmopolitan frame. The authors are not completely comfortable
with these typologies because of their focus on the vertical relation of the state and a global center, and
are not sure where their conception of mutual recognition fits into this presentation of English school
frames. Managed mutual recognition reflects both pluralist and cosmopolitan visions, supported in
many cases by a solidarist process-oriented framework. See the discussion of the structure of MRAs
supra Part II.
115. The framing paper distinguishes between rules for states to police delegation of authority to the
global center versus rules for the center to police enforcement of rules by states. See Kingsbury et al.,
supra note 90. Although the framing paper addresses the role of central judicial institutions in policing
national decisionmaking, these institutions can also police the actions of central rule-making bodies, as
they do in federalist systems. The European Court of Justice, for example, can determine that E.U.
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ing the European Union thus facilitates the legitimate application of the mutual
recognition principle.116
In large part, the aim of transparency, reasoned justifications, and judicial
review mechanisms is to empower publics and public advocates, wherever they
are located, to oversee regulators. The institutionalization and legalization of
mutual recognition can help to assure citizens of polity A that regulators of polity B act transparently toward their own citizens who, in turn, can press polity
B’s regulators to protect their own safety. In a world in which transnational
economic exchange occurs daily, and in which under-resourced regulators implicitly engage in de facto recognition of foreign regulatory standards and procedures on account of this exchange, mutual empowerment of publics through
these accountability mechanisms is essential.
Mutual recognition regimes thus retain the territorial element of national
democratic accountability, which is one of their advantages in comparison with
centralized and global market alternatives. When national polities hold specific
regulatory preferences, these polities will tailor and constrain the substantive
scope, procedural conditions, and geographic boundaries of a mutual recognition regime. Former E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy recently referred
to these national preferences as “collective preferences” (or “préferences collectives”), in contradistinction to individual preferences reflected in, and facilitated
by, autonomous market processes.117 “Collective choices” (or “choix collectives”), however, may be a preferred term to account for the context-contingent
nature of these collective processes. While the term “collective preferences”
suggests something inherent that can presumably be inferred (as economists
like to do), “collective choices” are not fixed in time, but are determined
through political processes. They must be explicitly made and defended.
A number of commentators have theorized democracy operating beyond
the state, whether through conceptualizing democracy in traditional ways at a
global level, as through the creation of a global parliamentary assembly,118 or

bodies have exceeded their powers (as it did in the Tobacco advertising case), have violated substantive
rights, or have failed to exercise due process. See Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and
Council of the European Union, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1175 (2000).
116. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 6, para. 1, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, art. 6 (“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
Status.”).
117. See E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, “The Emergence of Collective Preferences in
International Trade: Implications for Regulating Globalisation,” Address at “Conference on
“Collective preferences and global gouvernance [sic]: what future for the multilateral trading system”
(Sept. 15, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), transcript available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission_1999_2004/
lamy/speeches_articles/spla242_en.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2005); see also Steve Charnovitz, An Analysis of Pascal Lamy’s Proposal on
Collective Preferences. (GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 122, 2004) (on file with Law
& Contemp. Probs.), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=639322 (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
118. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Bridging the Globalization Gap: Toward a Global Parliament, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 212, 216 (2001); see also DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL
ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995).
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through recasting the concept of democracy in “deliberative” terms.119 Yet one
should be sceptical of democracy functioning through global institutions, which
is why the decentralized model represented by the mutual recognition approach
is preferred by many, including the authors.120 It makes more sense to expand
accountability beyond the polity not through creating elected legislative bodies
at the global level, but rather through expanding other accountability mechanisms, such as those used traditionally in national administrative law. As for the
concept of deliberation, while the dynamic, participatory, process-based approach of managed mutual recognition regimes can facilitate deliberative practices, it is not necessary to re-theorize democracy in deliberative terms in order
to legitimize and justify these transnational regimes.
Normatively, mutual recognition regimes and transnational governance are
best viewed as operating through chains of accountability. The democratic
component operates primarily at the national level. Other (largely procedural)
accountability mechanisms are used to ensure the accountability of foreign
regulators to each other, who, in turn, are responsible to their own national
constituencies. In this dynamic, reputational accountability plays a key role,
both among regulators and law-makers and in relation to their respective publics. From a principal-agent perspective, in mutual recognition arrangements,
the ultimate principals remain the public within a national polity, their respective agents being their national regulators who, in turn, engage with foreign
regulatory counterparts. Although supranational actors and institutions play a
role, and although publics can organize transnationally, the starting (and most
important) point of the accountability chain remains citizens at the national
level.
In sum, the various accountability mechanisms—procedural, rights-based,
and democratic—can be characterized in terms of operating as ex ante and ex
post checks within the mutual recognition process. The ex ante and ex post
controls facilitate the accountability of decisionmakers both to their own publics and to an enlarged public through regulators’ interaction with each other.
Certain procedural mechanisms, such as transparency obligations, provide accountability safeguards simply by enabling constituents to react to developments based on new information. Other mechanisms, such as ex ante notice
and comment procedures and ex post rights to judicial review, provide for more
explicit safeguards. Combined, they operate as part of an accountability chain,
first of regulatory authorities to their domestic publics, and then of regulatory
authorities to each other, this time overseen by both domestic and transnationally-organized publics, as well as (potentially) through supranational institutions. Functionally, because mutual recognition regimes rely on national ad-

119. See, e.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster, ed., 1998); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
120. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: the Political Normative and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 629 (2004); Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, This is
My EUtopia. . ., 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 767 (2002).
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ministrative bodies, it is much easier to adapt them—compared to arrangements
involving international bodies—to obtain optimal results, and, in this way, more
legitimate outcomes. Ultimately, it is the dynamic aspect of managed mutual
recognition that must ensure that regulators remain responsive both to each
other and to their publics.
VI
POWER ASYMMETRIES: THE NEED FOR A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
Mutual recognition arrangements, like any governance mechanism, are subject to power asymmetries. Power is a complex, multifaceted concept which
generally refers to the way actors and structures determine and shape the actions, choices, opportunities, understandings, and identities of others—with different emphases placed on these terms depending on the school of thought.121
Power can operate in multiple ways. In the MRA context, power will tend not
to operate directly, as when one actor deploys resources, rewards, and threats to
alter another’s behavior. Rather, power will tend to operate indirectly through
structures that constrain the choices parties have and the issues and arguments
they may raise.
For example, mutual recognition arrangements could be viewed as based on
an “E.U. model” the E.U. is exporting, or attempting to export, globally. To
detractors, they reflect European “neo-colonialism” and “economic imperialism,” and to defenders they reflect the E.U.’s “normative power.”122 The E.U.
model is worth emulating for the way in which it combines diversity, collaboration, and “other-regardingness” in the implementation of regulatory policies.123
Nonetheless, the model does not eliminate the power dimension from the mutual recognition game of mirrors. When the E.U. negotiates a mutual recognition arrangement with a third party, it has two significant advantages. It has a
first-mover advantage in that it already has created functioning structures and
standards that involve regulatory exchange among multiple polities. It is thus
simpler and more efficient for the third country to adapt to these existing standards and procedural mechanisms than to negotiate the adoption of an entirely
new arrangement. Thus, the procedures and standards adopted may tend to be
those already implemented within the E.U. itself. The third country will find
itself in a similar situation as a country desiring to accede to the European Union. The E.U. defines the terms.
In addition to experience, the E.U. wields considerable market leverage in
determining standards and regulatory structures required to implement mutual
recognition policies. This market leverage has increased as the E.U. has con-

121. See BARNETT & DUVALL, POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2005); JOHN SCOTT, POWER
(2001); DENNIS WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND USES (2002).
122. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Power of the Superpowerless, in BEYOND PARADISE AND POWER,
(Tod Lindberg, ed., 2005).
123. See Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 120.
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tinued to expand to encompass new members. Firms that desire access to the
large E.U. market can pressure their national officials to adapt their national
system to accommodate a reciprocal trading arrangement with the E.U. Consciously or unconsciously, the E.U. can export its systems globally because
other countries’ constituents desire access to the valuable and expanding E.U.
market.
Mutual recognition arrangements can also be criticized because private parties may use them to push for particular substantive goals, including those of
deregulation.124 If mutual recognition arrangements are to be enforced by the
home state, and the home state does not do so adequately, there are, of course,
moral hazard problems: mutual recognition could facilitate de facto deregulation, at least to the extent that safeguard provisions in MRAs meant to ensure
against such developments cannot easily be enforced (think, especially, of recognition applied to internet-based services or satellite television). In short, the
law-in-action of MRA implementation may differ from the regime’s initial
goals. Mutual recognition arrangements can include safeguards, such as monitoring mechanisms and exit options, to ensure that consumers are not harmed.
They can also spur regulatory learning that triggers a trading up of standards
and procedures, and not a leveling down. Nonetheless, mutual recognition arrangements will need to address concerns that, when improperly managed, they
could place consumers at risk.
Mutual recognition agreements can be criticized as well because they have
not been applied multilaterally and thus could constitute a form of preferential
and discriminatory treatment, undermining the intent of multilateral agreements such as those of the World Trade Organization. The lack of multilateral
MRAs thus raises the following key questions: How open are mutual recognition regimes? Are only those states with advanced regulatory systems or large
markets the exclusive beneficiaries of mutual recognition regimes? Are developing countries once more shut out of lucrative markets? Is non-discriminatory
mutual recognition an oxymoron? 125
In principle, the WTO could require bilateral and plurilateral MRA regimes
to be open to third parties, and to a certain extent it already does so.126 However, there are strong reasons that judicial enforcement of “openness” should
not be too stringent, lest it be a strong disincentive to enter into mutual recogni-

124. See, e.g., Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals, supra note 27, at 51 (“Although the
original goal of the MRA annexes may have been to facilitate transatlantic trade, firms simultaneously
focused on the deregulation of domestic product approvals.”).
125. Nicolaidis, Oxymoron, supra note 54.
126. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Promising Approaches and Principle Obstacles to Mutual Recognition
in International Trade in Professional Services: Advancing Liberalization Through Regulatory Reform
133 (OECD Proceedings 1997); Kalypso Nicolaidis & Joel P. Trachtman, From Policed Regulation to
Managed Recognition: Mapping the Boundary in GATS, in GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION (Pierrre Sauve & Robert M. Stern, eds., 2000); Liberalization,
Regulation and Recognition for Services Trade, in SERVICES TRADE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
(Sherry M. Stephenson, ed., 2000); Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition? Standardization and
Regional Integration Under Article XXIV of GATT, 6 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 459 (2003).
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tion arrangements in the first place, especially in light of the resource-intensive
nature of MRAs. Rather, a preferred approach would be for WTO members to
create procedures for the progressive opening of MRAs pursuant to a dynamic
process. For example, MRAs could include a special category of “associate parties” who could participate in MRA cooperative networks, evaluation and accreditation missions, field trips, and meetings so that they may become more
knowledgeable of the conditions for their eventual inclusion. There could also
be procedures for the “transitivity” among MRAs so that when one country is a
party to two MRAs, the other countries could reciprocally benefit from each
MRA, subject again to agreed conditions.127
Nonetheless, developing countries, in particular, are less likely to be parties
to MRAs for multiple reasons. Their markets are small so there is less bottomup demand for them to be parties to MRAs. They are more likely to lack regulatory capacity to ensure the “trust” required for the supply of an effective mutual recognition regime. The standards that developed countries may require
for developing countries to enter the arrangement might not be appropriate for
the country’s priorities in light of the regulatory costs of the arrangement and
the country’s severely constrained resources. Thus, like other governance models, mutual recognition arrangements could discriminate against constituents in
states that are most in need of favorable and preferential access to the world’s
most valuable markets. Even if mutual recognition regimes are subsequently
extended to poorer states, these states still will not have participated in the initial construction of the regime. They will merely receive what others have “mutually” created beforehand.
This being said, from a policymaking perspective, all governance mechanisms are subject to imperfections; thus the key issue is how parties participate,
or otherwise are represented, in an institutional context in comparison with alternative non-idealized institutional settings.128 From the perspective of choosing policy, one needs to assess mutual recognition arrangements in comparison
with their alternatives.
The mutual recognition approach contrasts with pure “free trade,” “sovereignty,” and centralized governance models. These alternative governance approaches also suffer from significant defects. The pure free trade approach will
often not provide the safeguards necessary for the protection of host state citizens and thus will often encounter challenges that will need to be addressed either unilaterally by host state governments or in collaboration with others. The
centralized governance model, focused on international harmonization, lacks
democratic legitimacy at the global level and functionally does not adequately
127. See discussion in Nicolaidis, Faces, supra note 68. The transitivity could be limited to specific
sectors that the MRAs have in common, unless they involve horizontal, across-the-board MRAs.
There could also be procedures for building trust between any new parties before any extension occurred.
128. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001); Shaffer, Power, supra note 16.
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permit for diversity that responds to rapid technological change and to local
contexts, needs, and priorities. A “sovereignty” approach that relies only on
“national treatment” is likely to give rise to more frequent and intensive crossborder regulatory conflicts in an economically globalized world.
The mutual recognition approach, in contrast, represents a coordinated approach to the regulation of global market processes among diverse jurisdictions.
It sets up collaborative governance forms involving mechanisms of oversight
and regulatory exchange that include multiple countries and that implicitly take
account of the interests and perspectives of those outside any single polity.
Unlike the pure sovereignty approach, a mutual recognition regime creates ongoing procedures that facilitate opportunities for mutual learning, technical assistance, and regulatory exchange that otherwise might not exist, potentially
avoiding conflicts in the first place. Mutual recognition arrangements can also
facilitate the resolution of disputes ex post because regulatory authorities will
have experience working with each other. In addition, from a power-oriented
perspective, although the sovereignty approach may be decentralized formally,
in practice it can entail the unilateral exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
those who can—in particular, those wielding market clout, relying on access to
their internal market as leverage to impose their standards and laws in a direct
and coercive manner. Countries will (and should) impose border controls to
ensure the safety of their citizens from harm, one way or the other. The mutual
recognition approach, in contrast to the others, explicitly calls for and creates
cross-border networks of collaboration and exchange.
Finally, mutual recognition regimes, when extended to developing countries,
can also create leverage for the provision of development aid, technical assistance, and capacity building to ensure that the country can meet health, safety,
and other requirements. Under a mutual recognition arrangement, developed
country regulators can work directly with those in developing countries to assist
them in their regulatory endeavours, in coordination with national and international development agencies.
VII
CONCLUSION: THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION ANGLE,
A LENS ON THE GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROJECT
This article has sought to demonstrate that the study of mutual recognition
regimes should be put at the core of the discipline described in this volume as
global administrative law. Recognition is pervasive in an economically integrated world, whether that recognition is formal and mutually agreed upon or is
informally applied. Thus, a better understanding of the dynamics and dilemmas
of recognition provides an important lens on the project as a whole. This occurs
on multiple counts.
First, anyone examining the global administrative law construct, or any
other analytic frame, must question the value of the distinction between that
construct and what is more generally referred to as “global governance.” Is
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administrative law an alternative or an overarching concept regarding other
analytic frames? Can it be combined with alternative frames, such as the use of
contract analogies by economists, game theorists, rational institutionalists, and
law economics scholars to analyze international institutions and regimes, or the
use of constitutional analogies by some public choice theorists and many theorists of cosmopolitan governance? Is the distinction between global administrative law and global governance positively and normatively relevant?
Attention to the process of recognition helps to demonstrate the value of a
global administrative law frame. To start, the frame is much less abstract than
that of global constitutional or contract analogies, and in being more concrete,
it helps us focus on forms of transnational law praxis that take place every day
in the small-scale encounters—and implicit and explicit processes of recognition—that shape regulatory and market outcomes. This positive focus on practice helps give prominence to central normative concerns as well. In particular,
it presses us to examine the practical mechanisms needed to make transnational
governance more accountable and legitimate.
Much of the existing analysis of “global governance” operates not only at a
more abstract level: it also misses much of what takes place in terms of transnational regulatory practice because of its focus on overarching global institution-building. Much of the literature on global constitutionalism, for instance,
reflects a focus on the vertical relation between the international and national
orders. Similarly, the international contract frame tends to concentrate on negotiations over, and rationales for, global institutions and regimes. In this respect, one advantage of the global administrative law frame is that it shows how
national law and practice are the starting points for examining the horizontal relationships among state regulatory institutions. As the framing paper highlights, transnational governance necessarily involves regulatory administration
and thus builds and borrows from domestic administrative law regimes. Much
of transnational governance can be viewed as an extension of the polity to engage with those outside of national borders. Through such extension, transnational governance involves the interaction among national laws and practices.
It is necessary nonetheless to ask whether the focus on administrative law
does not overly deemphasize political concerns in favor of technocratic ones. It
appears, for example, that the framing paper exhibits a certain reluctance and
constraint in taking on the democracy agenda, possibly as a reflection of the
administrative law construct itself. This article has attempted to highlight the
political nature of mutual recognition arrangements and the democracy dilemmas that they raise have been highlighted. Mechanisms for the extension of the
polity so that national decisionmaking is made accountable to an enlarged public constitute an eminently political project. That the global administrative law
project leads back to national administrative practice helps to address the democratic dilemmas of transnational governance. From a normative perspective,
accountability must start with democratic processes at the national level and,
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from there, operate through accountability chains using such administrative law
techniques as transparency, reasoned decisionmaking, and judicial review.129
One can also question whether the project’s frame implicitly assumes the existence of a single administrative space, or at least a single space in the making,
on account of the use of the term global administrative law. Are there not
rather a number of overlapping, intersecting, international or transnational pluralistic spaces, as highlighted by the lens of recognition? And, if this is the case,
is not the key to understanding the emerging transnational administrative law
the question of the relationship between these spaces, and thus implicitly, of the
scope, conditions, and procedures for their recognition?
If so, then the project could further examine what constitutes an open or
closed space, and, in the case of MRAs, an open or closed mutual recognition
regime. This article has thus raised questions about the transitivity of the relationship between overlapping transnational regimes—that is, of how one bilateral or plurilateral relationship interacts (and should interact) with another. In
the case of mutual recognition regimes, for instance, the question can be horizontal or vertical. From a horizontal perspective, if regime A recognizes standards or conformity assessment in regime B, and regime B recognizes standards
or conformity assessment in regime C, will and should regime A recognize regime C, and if so, under what scope and conditions? The issue of transivity can
combine horizontal (between transnational regimes) and vertical (within a
multi-level jurisdictional structure) mechanisms of recognition. Thus, if a regime includes a country with a federalist structure that recognizes regulatory
authority within its borders according to approaches different than those of
other parties to the regime, will these other parties recognize its domestic patterns of recognition? The potential for, and the absence of, “recognition of recognition” testifies to the complex and fragmented nature of the emerging transnational system.
Although transnational mechanisms can spur the
plurilateralization and multilateralization of bilateral regimes, the key question,
positively and normatively, is—how can it be done?
Connected to these prior points, the project’s analytical categories could be
refined, particularly respecting, the horizontal nature of the vast majority of
trans-national governance. This article’s analysis of recognition makes clear the
distinction between vertical and horizontal governance mechanisms—that is,
between disciplines shaped and enforced by supranational institutions and disciplines shaped and enforced by states in relation to each other. This distinction
again helps us to evaluate the relation of general accountability issues to the
democracy dilemma. The key challenge involves the relation of internal and external accountability, contrasting, as do the authors of the framing paper, rules
for constraining states and rules for constraining international institutions.
There may indeed be qualitatively different accountability challenges in a horizontal and a vertical setting: holding authorities in another country accountable

129. See Part V.
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may ultimately require a greater degree of democratic delegation than holding
international institutions accountable.
In this respect, a key issue for any global administrative law or governance
regime is that of the borders of recognition. This article has shown why there
should be no defined borders. The advantage of the mutual recognition approach is that it involves a dynamic process of ongoing exchange among public
and private actors from different polities. The border for the application of a
mutual recognition regime is thus a continuously contested one, subject to negotiation, deliberation, and ex ante and ex post controls. As examined earlier,130
the line has been shifting through the expansion of national treatment toward
mutual recognition of product standards, on the one hand, and away from recognition through the more stringent scrutiny of foreign production processes as
reflected in the “trade and . . .” debates involving foreign environmental and labor regulation, on the other. Another advantage of attending to the pluralist,
horizontal nature of transnational governance, as opposed to a centralized, vertical hierarchical approach, is that the former explicitly accounts for these shifting boundaries.
In examining the pluralist nature of the transnational order, this article has
also stressed the key distinction between substantive standards and the recognition process.131 Although participating states must determine whether home- or
host-state national standards apply when they allocate jurisdictional competence, they do not need to determine harmonized standards. A central point of
managed mutual recognition is that global governance can function without
global standards or a global government, thus retaining diversity within a transnational framework. Mutual recognition involves a dynamic process of regulatory coordination, confidence building, and more optimal allocation of administrative authority in order to attempt to ensure that whatever standards are
applied are adequate and appropriate. This process involves an ongoing, managed dialogue and is thus to be distinguished from the more fixed nature of centralized governance, at least when it comes to standard-setting, as opposed to
ensuring the consistency and fairness of procedures. The only substantive standards entailed in mutual recognition arrangements are those involving the
choice over the appropriate standard of review of administrative decisions.
By creating a decentralized framework for transnational engagement, the
mutual recognition process is obviously conflict-prone.132 It can lead to clashes
of regulatory and legal cultures, tensions around appropriate jurisdiction, and
the infamous “race to the bottom.” But it is more likely to lead to positive outcomes. First, it can lead to adaptation toward more effective standards as regulators learn from each other’s practices. In the process of exchange, regulators
engage in forms of mutual technical assistance when reputational concerns cre-

130. See Part II.B.
131. See Part II.C.
132. See Nicolaidis, Thesis, supra note 54.
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ate a check against the temptation to engage in a race to the bottom (which race
is seldom observed in practice). Second, it can lead to regulators’ increased
trust and confidence in each other’s regulatory regimes so that systems may retain their own standards in a pluralist world, but in a manner that facilitates,
and does not impede, mutual exchange. Third, the transparency requirements
of mutual recognition regimes can facilitate the formation of transnational
processes that, in turn, can help to empower domestic publics to ensure that
their own regulators enforce agreed-upon standards. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, mutual recognition regimes can promote greater tolerance for difference, and, as a result, greater resilience of domestic polities when interacting
with each other, lessening the potential for conflict. Tolerance is indeed a defining feature of mutual recognition.133 Mutual recognition represents the acceptance of other systems and approaches as valid, having parallels with multiculturalist goals within polities. Instead of requiring others to assimilate dominant
national norms, mutual recognition arrangements promote the acceptance of
difference. As a dynamic process, managed mutual recognition regimes can
spur all of the above aims.
An implicit goal of the global administrative law project is to re-examine national administrative law itself. National regulatory systems need to adapt if
they are to fulfil their functions in a global economic order by developing new
mechanisms of regulatory exchange and accountability. As noted throughout
this article, transnational economic processes are occurring all around us. Like
it or not, forms of unilateral, often unconscious, de facto recognition necessarily
take place continuously since recognition is an implicit principle for the functioning of any integrated economic or political order. Mutual recognition arrangements thus constitute an institutionalization and legalization of recognition, offering transnational accountability mechanisms that otherwise would not
exist. Mutual recognition is both about expanding recognition when there has
been none, and about making prevailing recognition conditional on the respect
of fundamental norms, all within a transnational framework. Since regulators
already must rely to a great extent on foreign regulatory systems in an economically integrated world, mutual recognition regimes can help to provide the assurance of greater mutual oversight, review, and adaptation of national systems.

133. Held uses the term “reciprocal recognition” as the “second element of contemporary cosmopolitanism,” pursuant to which “each person . . . is required to respect everyone else’s status as a basic unit of moral interest.” David Held, From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism, in Held &
Koenig-Archibuigi, supra note 89, at 169.

